

B = Stephen Batchelor? (according to internet site)

SB = Stephen Batchelor: VERSES FROM THE CENTER: A BUDDHIST VISION OF THE SUBLIME (New York: Riverhead Books, 2000)

S = Frederick J. Streng, EMPTINESS: A STUDY IN RELIGIOUS MEANING (New York: Abingdon Press, 1967), Appendix A & B; pp. 183-227

G = Jay L. Garfield, THE FUNDAMENTAL WISDOM OF THE MIDDLE WAY: NAGARAJUNA'S MULAMDHYAMAKAKARIKA (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995)

I = Kenneth K. Inada, NAGARJUNA: A TRANSLATION OF HIS MULAMADHYAMAKAKARIKA WITH AN INTRODUCTORY ESSAY (Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1970)

K= David J. Kalupahana, MULAMADHYAMAKAKARIKA OF NAGARJUNA: THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1986)

For an English translation of the karikas (virtually identical with G above) together with Je Tsongkhapa's commentary on them, consult Ngawang Samten and Jay L. Garfield (trans.), OCEAN OF REASONING: A GREAT COMMENTARY ON NAGARJUNA'S MULAMADHYAMAKAKARIKA (NY: Oxford University Press, 2006)

मूलमध्यमककारिका आर्यनागार्जुनस्य

पूर्वपरीक्षा नाम नवमं प्रकरणं

B: Investigation of the Presence of Something Prior (Already)

S: An Analysis of "the Pre-existent Reality" (purva) (grasper and grasping)

G: Examination of the Prior Entity

I: Examination of the Antecedent State of the Self

K: Examination of the Prior Entity

दर्शनश्रवणादीनि वेदनादीनि चाप्यथ।

भवन्ति यस्य प्रागेभ्यः सो ऽस्तीत्येके वदन्त्युत ॥ १

B: Some say that whatever is involved in seeing, hearing etc. and feeling etc. exists prior to them.

S: Certain people say: Prior to seeing hearing, and other [sensory faculties] together with sensation and other [mental phenomena] is that to which they belong.

SB: Am I already here, Before I see and taste and feel?

G: Since sight and hearing, etc., and feeling, etc., exist, he who has and uses them must exist prior to those, some say.

I: Of the existence of an entity which sees, hears, etc., or which feels, etc., some people assert that it exists prior to its functions.

K: “For whomsoever there exists seeing, hearing, etc., and feeling, etc., he exists prior to these.” So do some declare.

कथं ह्यविद्यमानस्य दर्शनादि भविष्यति।

भावस्य तस्मात्प्रागेभ्यः सो ऽस्ति भावो व्यवस्थितः ॥ २

B: If [that] thing is not evident, how can there be seeing etc? Therefore, the presence [of that] thing [must] exist before them.

S: [They reason:] How will there be seeing, etc. of someone (i.e. as the subject seeing) who does not exist? Therefore, there exists a definite (vyavasthita) entity before that [seeing, etc.].

SB: If not, how could I see and taste and feel?

G: If there were no existent thing, how could seeing, etc. arise? It follows from this that prior to this, there is an existent thing.

I: How is it that seeing, etc., come to be of a presently non-existing entity?

Consequently, the entity (seemingly) exists prior to its functions.

K: How can there be seeing, etc., of an existent who is not evident? Therefore, it is determined that, prior to these things, such an existent is.

दर्शनश्रवणादिभ्यो वेदनादिभ्य एव च।

यः प्राग्व्यवस्थितो भावः केन प्रज्ञप्यते ऽथ सः ॥ ३

B: What configures/makes known that thing which is present before seeing and hearing etc. and feeling etc.?

S: But that definite entity is previous to sight, hearing, etc., and sensation, etc. -- How can that [entity] be known?

SB: How can I know if I'm already here or not?

G: How is an entity existing prior to seeing, hearing, etc., and the felt, etc., itself known?

I: If the entity exists abidingly prior to its functions of seeing, hearing, etc., or feeling, etc., then by what means is it known?

K: Whatever existent is determined as existing prior to seeing, hearing, etc., and also feeling, etc., by what means is he (it) made known?

विनापि दर्शनादीनि यदि चासौ व्यवस्थितः।

अमून्यपि भविष्यन्ति विना तेन न संशयः ॥ ४

B: If it were present even without seeing etc., there would be no doubt that they would exist even without it.

S: And if that [entity] is determined without sight [and other sensory faculties], then, undoubtedly, those [sensory faculties] will exist without that [entity].
SB: If I were here without them, They could be here without me.
G: If it can abide without the seen, etc., then without a doubt, they can abide without it.
I: If the abiding entity could exist apart from the functions of seeing, etc., then undoubtedly the functions too could exist without the entity.
K: If he is determined as existing even without seeing, etc., undoubtedly even these (i.e., seeing, etc.) will exist without him.

अज्यते केन चित् कश्चित् किं चित्केन चिदज्यते।

कुतः किं चिद्विना कश्चित्किं चित्कं चिद्विना कुतः ॥ ५

B: It is illuminated by them; they are illuminated by it. How could it exist without them? How could they exist without it?
SB: I reveal them and they reveal me. How can I be here without them? How can they be here without me?
S: Someone becomes manifest by something (i.e. like vision); something is manifest by someone. How would someone exist without something? How would something exist without someone?
G: Someone is disclosed by something. Something is disclosed by someone. Without something how can someone exist? Without someone how can something exist?
I: An entity is made manifest by its attendant functions and, vice versa, the functions are known by way of the entity to which they belong. How is it possible for an entity to be without its functions and the functions without their entity?
K: Someone is made known by something. Something is made known by someone. How could there be someone without something and something without someone?

सर्वेभ्यो दर्शनादिभ्यः कश्चित्पूर्वो न विद्यते।

अज्यते दर्शनादिनामन्येन पुनरन्यदा ॥ ६

B: It is not evident prior to the totality of seeing etc. From among seeing etc. a different one illuminates [it] at different times.
SB: I am not already here, Before experience as such: Seeing reveals just the seer, Tasting just the taster, Feeling just the feeler.
S: [The opponent admits:] Someone does not exist previous to (purva) sight and all the other [faculties] together. [Rather,] he is manifested by any one of [them:] sight, etc., at any one time. (A owner that of only one of the senses at a time ?)
G: While prior to all of seeing, etc., that prior entity doesn't exist, through seeing, etc., by another one, that other one becomes disclosed.
I: No entity could exist prior to all its functions of seeing, etc. By means of the different functions of seeing, etc., the entity appears in different moments.
K: Someone is not evident prior to all of seeing, etc. Again, on different occasions, one could be made known by things different from seeing, etc.

सर्वेभ्यो दर्शनादिभ्यो यदि पूर्वं न विद्यते।

एकैकस्मात्कथं पूर्वं दर्शनादेः स विद्यते ॥ ७

B: If it is not evident prior to the totality of seeing etc., how can it be evident prior to [each of them] seeing etc. individually?

SB: If I'm not already here before them all, Could I be here before each one?

S: [Nagarjuna answers:] But if nothing exists previous to sight and all the other [faculties] together, how could that [being] exist individually before sight, etc.?

G: If prior to all of seeing, etc., no prior entity exists, how could an entity prior to each seeing exist?

I: If the entity does not exist prior to all its functions of seeing, etc., then how could it exist prior to each of the functions.

K: If someone existing prior to all of seeing, etc., is not evident, how can someone existing prior to each of seeing, etc., be evident?

द्रष्टा स एव स श्रोता स एव यदि वेदकः।

एकैकस्माद्भवेत्पूर्वं एवं चैतन्न युज्यते ॥ ८

B: If the seer itself [were] the hearer and the feeler [were] it too, if it existed prior to each, in that way it would not make sense.

SB: Can the seer taste? Can the taster feel?

S: [Further,] if that [being] were the "seer," that [being] were the "hearer," that [being] were the one who senses, then one [being] would exist previous to each. Therefore, this [hypothesis] is not logically justified. (That would also mean that there is a owner for each senses; one at a time.)

G: If the seer itself is the hearer itself, and the feeler itself, at different times, prior to each of these he would have to arise. But this makes no sense.

I: If (it is granted that) an entity which sees is concomitantly an entity which hears or feels, then that entity will exist prior to its functions. But such a situation could not be in accordance with reason.

K: If a seer is, at the same time, a hearer and feeler, than someone would exist prior to each one (of the functions). But this is not proper.

द्रष्टान्य एव श्रोतान्यो वेदको ऽन्यः पुनर्यदि।

सति स्याद्भूतारि श्रोता बहुबं चात्मनां भवेत् ॥ ९

B: If the seer were different, the hearer different, the feeler different, at the time the seer exists, there would be a hearer. Many selves would come about.

SB: Were they different, I would be legion.

S: On the other hand, if the "seer" were someone else, or the "hearer" were someone else, or the one who senses were someone else, then there would be a "hearers when there

was already a "seer," and that would mean a multiplicity of "selves" (atma). (Or it would mean that there are multiple simultaneous owners.)

G: If the seer itself is distinct, the hearer is distinct and the feeler is distinct, then when there is a seer there would also be a hearer, and there would have to be many selves.

I: If again (granted that) the entity which respectively sees, hears, and feels is individually distinct, then as there will be an entity which sees there will also be an entity which hears. But this situation would impose many forms on the entity.

K: If seer and hearer and feeler are different, then, when there is a seer, there also would be a hearer, and as such there would be a plurality of selves.

दर्शनश्रवणादीनि वेदनादीनि चाप्यथ।

भवन्ति येभ्यस्तेष्वेष भूतेष्वपि न विद्यते ॥ १०

B: Also it is not evident in the elements from which seeing and hearing etc. and feeling etc. occur.

SB: Nor am I tucked inside the elements, Whence seeing and tasting and feeling unfold.

S: In those elements (bhuta) from which seeing, hearing, etc., and sensation, etc., arise -- even in those elements that [being] does not exist.

G: Seeing and hearing, etc., and feeling, etc., and that from which these are arisen: there is no existent there.

I: Of the arising of the functions of seeing, hearing, feeling, etc. out of the Elements, the entity too cannot be found to exist.

K: It (i.e., the self) is not evident in the elements from which seeing, hearing, etc., and feeling, etc., come to be.

दर्शनश्रवणादीनि वेदनादीनि चाप्यथ।

न विद्यते चेद्यस्य स न विद्यन्त इमान्यपि ॥ ११

B: If that to which seeing and hearing etc. and feeling etc. belong is not evident, they too could not be evident.

SB: If I to whom these things belong, Cannot be found, How can they be found?

S: When he to whom seeing, hearing, etc., and feeling, etc. belong does not exist, then certainly they do not exist.

G: Seeing and hearing, etc., and feeling, etc., if that to which they belong does not exist, they themselves do not exist.

I: If the entity which sees, hears, etc., or which feels, etc., cannot be found, then the functions themselves cannot also be found to exist.

K: If he, to whom belongs seeing, hearing, etc., and feeling, etc., is not evident, then even these would not be evident.

प्राक् च यो दर्शनादिभ्यः सांप्रतं चोर्ध्वमेव च।

न विद्यते ऽस्ति नास्तीति निवृत्तास्तत्र कल्पनाः ॥ १२

B: Reject the concepts "it exists," "it doesn't exist" about that which is not evident prior to, now or after seeing etc.

SB: I do not precede them. Nor am I with them. Nor do I follow them.

Let go of "I am." Let go of "I am not."

S: For him who does not exist previous to, at the same time, or after seeing, etc. the conception "He exists," "He does not exist," is dissipated.

G: For whomever prior to, simultaneous with, or after seeing, etc., there is nothing, for such a one, assertions like "it exists" or "it does not exist" – such conceptions will cease.

I: Of an entity which does not exist prior to, concomitantly, or posterior to the functions of seeing, etc., the notions of existence and non-existence are unnecessary.

K: Wherein someone prior to, simultaneous with or posterior to, seeing, etc. is not evident, therein thoughts of existence and non-existence are also renounced.

अग्नीन्धनपरीक्षा नाम दशमं प्रकरणं

- B: Investigation of Fire and Firewood (Fire)
S: An Analysis of Fire and Kindling (fire and fuel)
G: Examination of Fire and Fuel
I: Examination of Wood and Fire
K: Examination of Fire and Fuel

यदिन्धनं स चेदग्निरेकत्वं कर्तृकर्मणोः ।

अन्यश्चेदिन्धनादग्निरिन्धनादप्यृते भवेत् ॥ १

- B: If firewood were fire, actor and act would be one. If fire were other than wood, it would occur even without wood.
S: If fire is identical to its kindling, then it is both producer and product. And if fire is different from kindling, then surely [fire] exists without kindling (i.e. separate).
SB: Were the fire its flames, Act and actor would be one. Were flames something else, They could not have lit this fire.
G: If fuel were fire then agent and action would be one. If fire were different from fuel, then it could arise without fuel.
I: If wood is the same as fire, then likewise the doer and his deed will be identical. If fire is distinct from wood, then it will exist without wood.
K: If fire were to be fuel, then there would be identity of agent and action. If fire were to be different from fuel, then it would exist even without the fuel.

.नित्यप्रदीप्त एव स्यादप्रदीपनहेतुकः ।

पुनरारम्भवैयर्थ्यमेवं चाकर्मकः सति ॥ २

- B: [Fire] would burn permanently and would not arise from causes for burning. Starting [a fire] would be meaningless. If it were like that, there would also be no act.
S: A [fire] which is perpetually burning would exist without a cause, which is kindling, Since another beginning would be pointless; in this case [fire] is without its object [i.e., burning of kindling].
SB: Independent and alone, Eternal flames would burn forever – Actors with no acts.
G: It would be forever aflame; flames could be ignited without a cause. Its beginning would be meaningless. In that case, it would be without any action.
I: If there is no cause for burning, then the fire should burn constantly. And there will be no purpose in fire to start (i.e., to burn) again and it will then be without a function.
K: A burning without a cause would be eternally aflame. Furthermore, its commencement will be rendered meaningless (useless). When that happens, it will be without a function.

परत्र निरपेक्षत्वादप्रदीपनहेतुकः ।

पुनरारम्भवैयर्थ्यं नित्यदीप्तः प्रसज्यते ॥ ३

B: Because [fire] does not depend on anything else, it would not arise from causes for burning. If it burned permanently, starting it would be meaningless.

S: [Fire] is without a cause, namely kindling, if it were independent of anything else; in which case another beginning would be pointless, and there is perpetual burning.

SB: Were the fire a fire, Only when it burns – How could you light this fire?

G: Since it would not depend on another ignition would be without a cause. If it were eternally in flames, starting it would be meaningless.

I: Being unrelated to an other, it (i.e., fire) will be something without a cause for burning. Moreover, it will follow that constantly burning fire would have no purpose of starting (i.e, burning) again.

K: A burning without a cause, because it is not contingent on another and, therefore, eternally aflame, would imply the meaninglessness of its commencement..

तत्रैतस्मादिध्यमानमिन्धनं भवतीति चेत्।

केनेध्य तामिन्धनं तत्तावन्मात्रमिदं यदा ॥ ४

B: Concerning this, if one thinks that while burning it is firewood, if it is such only at that time, by what could that firewood be ignited?

S: If it is maintained: Kindling is that which is being kindled, by what is kindling kindled, since kindling is only that [kindling]?

G: So, if one thinks that that which is burning is the fuel, if it is just this, how is this fuel being burned?

I: Thus, if it is granted that there is wood in the burning (process) and that only wood is burning, then by what means will it burn?

K: Herein, if it is assumed that fuel is the present burning and, therefore, that (i.e. burning) is merely this (i.e. fuel), by what is fuel being burnt?

अन्यो न प्राप्स्यते ऽप्राप्तो न धक्ष्यत्यदहन् पुनः।

न निर्वास्यत्यनिर्वाणः स्थास्यते वा स्वलिङ्गवान् ॥ ५

B: Because [fire] is other, it would not connect; if it did not connect, it would not ignite; if it did not ignite, it would not die; if it did not die, it would also remain in possession of its own characteristic.

S: [Fire], when different and not obtained [through kindling], will not obtain; not burning, it will not burn later; without extinction, it will not be extinguished; if there is no extinction, then it will remain with its own characteristics.

SB: Were your flames something else, They would never touch my fire, Never light it and never die. They would burn and burn and burn.

G: If they are different, and if one not yet connected isn't connected, the not yet burned will not be burned. They will not cease. If they do not cease then it will persist with its own characteristic.

I: A different thing (i.e., fire distinguished from wood) is never effected and a non-effected thing will never burn. And, in turn, a non-burning thing will never extinguish itself while a non-extinguishing thing, having its own characteristics, will continue to endure itself.

K: (Fuel) that is different is not reached; the unreached is not ignited. Furthermore, that which is not ignited does not cease. That which does not cease remains, like one has its own mark.

अन्य एवेन्धनादग्निरिन्धनं प्राप्नुयाद्यदि।

स्त्री संप्राप्नोति पुरुषं पुरुषश्च स्त्रियं यथा ॥ ६

B: Just as a woman connects with a man and a man too with a woman, although fire is other than wood, it is fit to connect with wood.

S: [The opponent claims:] If fire is different from kindling it could obtain the kindling as a woman obtains a husband, and a man [obtains] a wife.

SB: Though they are different, Flames touch fires As a woman touches a man And a man a woman. G: Just as a man and a woman connect to one another as man and woman, so if fire were different from fuel, fire and fuel would have to be fit for connection.

I: If fire which is distinct from wood should unite with wood, it would be like a woman united with a man and, vice versa, a man uniting with a woman.

K: If fire is different from fuel it would reach the fuel, just as a woman would reach for a man and a man for a woman.

अन्य एवेन्धनादग्निरिन्धनं काममाप्नुयात्।

आग्नीन्धने यदि स्यातामन्योन्येन तिरस्कृते ॥ ७

B: If fire and wood eliminated each other, even though fire is something other than wood, it would have to connect with wood.

S: [Nagarjuna answers:] Though fire is different from kindling, it could indeed obtain the kindling, on the condition that both fire and kindling can be reciprocally differentiated [—but, this is impossible].

SB: Flame and fire merge. They unite despite being different.

G: And, if fire and fuel preclude each other, then fire being different from fuel, it must still be asserted that they connect.

I: Fire which is distinct from wood will unite with the latter freely as you contend, if and only if, the two have mutually distinct existences.

K: The fire that is different from fuel may reach the fuel only if fire and fuel were to exist mutually separated.

यदीन्धनमपेक्ष्याग्निरपेक्ष्याग्निं यदीन्धनं।

कतरत्पूर्वनिष्पन्नं यदपेक्ष्याग्निरिन्धनं ॥ ८

B: If fire were dependent on wood and wood were dependent on fire, of what becomes fire and wood dependently, which would be established first?

S: If the fire is dependent on the kindling, and if the kindling is dependent on the fire which is attained first, dependent on which they are fire and kindling?

SB: If flames depend on fires And fires upon flames, What comes first?

G: If fire depends on fuel, and fuel depends on fire, on what are fire and fuel established as dependent? Which one is established first?

I: If fire is dependent on wood and wood on fire, then each one must have had a prior completed state and to which the other depends.

K: If fire is contingent upon fuel and fuel upon fire, which of them is pre-accomplished so that fire could be contingent upon fuel?

यदीन्धनमपेक्ष्याग्निरग्नेः सिद्धस्य साधनं।

एवं सतीन्धनं चापि भविष्यति निरग्निकं ॥ ९

B: If fire were dependent on wood, [already] established fire would be established [again]. Firewood also would be [such] even without fire.

S: If fire is dependent on kindling, so is the proof of the proved fire. Thus, being kindling it will exist without fire.

SB: Were the fire already there, The flame that lit it would flare again Or that fire would flicker flamelessly.

G: If fire depends on fuel, it would be the establishment of an established fire. And the fuel could be fuel without any fire.

I: If fire is dependent on wood then an already existing fire will again be effectuating itself. If that is so then wood also will exist without fire.

K: If fire were to be contingent upon fuel, there would be proof of fire that is already proved (to exist). When that is the case, even fuel would exist without fire.

यो ऽपेक्ष्य सिध्यते भावस्तमेवापेक्ष्य सिध्यति।

यदि यो ऽपेक्षितव्यः स सिध्यतां कमपेक्ष्य कः ॥ १०

B: If a thing (A) is established dependently (on B), [but] if what it depends upon (B) is established also in dependence on that very thing (A), what would be established in dependence on what?

S: When a thing (bhava) is proved by being dependent on something else, then it proves the other by being dependent [on it]. If that which is required for dependence must be proved, then what is dependent on what?

SB: If what flames depend on Depend on flames, What depends on what?

I: If an entity depends on another entity in order to manifest itself, the latter will also depend on the former for its manifestation. If what is to be dependent on for manifestation already exists, then (the question is) what depends on what?

G: If that on which an entity depends is established on the basis of the entity depending on it, what is established in dependence on what?

यो ऽपेक्ष्य सिध्यते भावः सो ऽसिद्धो पेक्षते कथं।

अथाप्यपेक्षते सिद्धस्त्वपेक्षास्य न युज्यते ॥ ११

B: How can a thing (A) which is established dependently (on B) be dependent (on B) when it (A) is not established? If one asks, “how can establishment be dependent?” It is not reasonable for it (A) to be dependent.

S: If that thing is proved by being dependent, how can that which has not been proved be dependent? So, that which is proved is dependent; but the dependence is not possible.

SB: How can flames-to-be Depend on anything? What would do the depending?

G: What entity is established through dependence? If it is not established, then how could it depend? However, if it is established merely through dependence, that dependence makes no sense.

I: An entity depends on an other for realization (i.e., manifestation) but, in an unrealized (i.e., unmanifested) state, what is the manner of dependence? And again, even though (the entity) is already in a dependently manifested state, the nature of dependence is not possible.

K: Whatever existent that is established through contingency, how can that, if it is not yet established, be contingent? Even so (how can) that which is already established be contingent? For, its contingency is not proper.

अपेक्ष्येन्धनमग्निर्नानापेक्ष्याग्निरिन्धनं।

अपेक्ष्येन्धनमग्निं न नानापेक्ष्याग्निमिन्धनं ॥ १२

B: There is no fire that is dependent on wood; there is also no fire that is not dependent on wood. There is no wood that is dependent on fire; there is also no wood that is not dependent on fire.

S: Fire does not exist in relation to kindling; and fire does not exist unrelated to kindling. Kindling does not exist in relation to fire; and kindling does not exist unrelated to fire.

SB: Flames do not depend on fires Nor are they independent of them. Fires do not depend on flames Nor are they independent of them.

G: Fire is not dependent on fuel. Fire is not independent of fuel. Fuel is not dependent on fire. Fuel is not independent of fire.

I: Fire does not exist by dependence on wood nor does it exist by non-dependence on wood. Likewise, wood does not exist by dependence or non-dependence on fire.

K: Fire is not contingent upon fuel; fire is not non-contingent upon fuel. Fuel is not contingent upon fire; fuel is not non-contingent upon fire.

आगच्चत्यन्यतो नाग्निरिन्धने ऽग्निर्न विद्यते।

अत्रेन्धने शेषमुक्तम् गम्यमानगतागतैः ॥ १३

B: Fire does not come from something else; fire also does not exist in wood. Likewise, the remainder of wood has been shown by gone, not-gone and going.

S: Fire does not come from something else; and fire does not exist in kindling.
 SB: Flames and fires explain everything: The self and what it grasps
 G: Fire does not come from something else, nor is fire in fuel itself. Moreover, fire and the rest are just like the moved, the not-moved, and the goer.
 I: Fire does not come from something else nor does it exist in the wood. With respect to wood the remaining issues have been taken up in the discussion of present passing away, that which has transpired, and that which has not transpired.
 K: Fire does not come out of something different nor is fire seen to be in the fuel. Herein, with regard to fuel, the rest is stated as in the case of present moving, the moved and the not moved.

इन्धनं पुनरग्निर्न नाग्निरन्यत्र चेन्धनात्।

नाग्निरिन्धनवान्नाग्नाविन्धनानि न तेषु सः ॥ १४

B: Wood itself is not fire; fire is also not something other than wood. Fire does not possess wood; wood does not exist in fire; that (fire) does not exist in it.
 S: Fire is not identical to kindling, but fire is not in anything other than kindling. Fire does not have kindling as its property; also, the kindling is not in fire and vice versa.
 G: Fuel is not fire. Fire does not arise from anything different from fuel. Fire does not possess fuel. Fuel is not in fire, nor vice versa.
 I: Again, fire is not wood nor is it in something else than wood. Fire does not contain wood. There is neither wood in fire nor fire in wood.
 K: Furthermore, fuel is not fire. Apart from fuel, there is no fire. Fire is not possessed of fuel. Fuel is not in the fire, nor is it (i.e. fire) in them.

अग्नीन्धनाभ्यां व्याख्यात आत्मोपादानयोः क्रमः।

सर्वो निरवशेषेण सार्धं घटपटादिभिः ॥ १५

B: Through fire and wood is explained without exception all the stages of self and the grasped and at the same time jugs, cloth and so on.
 S: By [the analysis of] fire and kindling the syllogism of the individual self (atma) and "the acquiring" (upadana) is fully and completely explained, as well as "the jar" and "the cloth" and other [analogies].
 SB: And also jugs and rolls of cloth.
 G: Through discussion of fire and fuel, the self and the aggregates, the pot and cloth all together, without remainder have been explained.
 I: By means of the analysis of fire and wood, the total relationship between atman and upadana, and along with (notions of) earthen jar, cloth, etc., have all been explained without fail.
 K: Through the examples of fire and fuel, together with the examples of pot, cloth, etc., every method of analysis of the self and grasping have been explained without exception.

आत्मनश्च सतत्त्वं ये भावानां च पृथक् पृथक्।

निर्दिशन्ति न तान्मन्ये शासनस्यार्थकोविदान्॥ १६

B: I do not think those who teach the identity or difference of self and things are wise in the meaning of the teaching.

S: Those who specify the nature of the individual self and of existing things (bhava) as radically different — those people I do not regard as ones who know the sense of the teaching.

SB: Identity and difference? Of self? Of things?

G: I do not think those who teach that the self is the same as or different from the entities understand the meaning of the doctrine.

I: Insofar as I am concerned, those who assign them distinct existences cannot be considered truly knowledgeable of the (Buddha's) teachings.

K: Those who posit the substantiality of the self as well as of discrete existents – these I do not consider to be experts in the meaning of the (Buddha's) message.

पूर्वापरकोटिपरीक्षा नामैकादशमं प्रकरणं

B: Investigation of Extremes of Before and After (Before)

S: An Analysis of the Past (purva) and Future Limits (aparakiti) [of Existence] (samsara)

G: Examination of the Initial and Final Limits

I: Examination of Antecedent and Consequent States in the Empirical Realm

K: Examination of the Prior and Posterior Extremities

पूर्वा प्रज्ञायते कोटिर्नेत्युवाच महामुनिः।

संसारो ऽनवराग्रो हि नास्यादिर्नापि पश्चिनं॥ १

B: When asked, "is a before-extreme evident?" the great Muni said, "it is not." Samsara has no beginning, no end; it has no before, no after.

S: The great ascetic [Buddha] said: "The extreme limit (koti) of the past cannot be discerned." "Existence-in-flux" (samsara) is without bounds; indeed, there is no beginning nor ending of that [existence].

SB: Was there are before before? If life has no beinning and no end, No before and no after, How can it be centered in a present?

G: When asked about the beginning, the Great Sage said that nothing is known of it. Cyclic existence is without end and beginning. So there is no beginning or end.

I: The great wise one (i.e. Sakyamuni) has said that the state anterior to samsara (i.e., life-death cycle or the empirical realm) cannot be grasped. For, samsara has no beginning and end; that is to say, no definite points of commencement and conclusion.

K: The Great Sage has stated that the prior end is not known. The life-process is without beginning and end. There is neither a beginning nor an end.

नैवाग्रं नावरं यस्य तस्य मध्यं कुतो भवेत्।

तस्मान्नात्रोपपद्यन्ते पूर्वापरसहक्रमाः ॥ २

B: For that without beginning [and] end, where can a middle be in that? Therefore, it is not possible for it to have before, after, and simultaneous phases.

S: How could there be a middle portion of that which has no "before" and "after"; it follows that "past," "future," and "simultaneous events" do not obtain.

G: Where there is no beginning or end, how could there be a middle? It follows that thinking about this in terms of prior, posterior, and simultaneous is not appropriate.

I: As there are no beginning and end, how could there be a middle? Therefore, the simultaneity, anterior, and posterior states (of samsara) are not possible.

K: How could there be the middle of that which has neither a beginning nor an end? Therefore, the methods of (distinguishing) the prior, the posterior or both together (i.e., the middle) are not appropriate.

पूर्वम् जातिर्यदि भवेज्जरामरणमुत्तरं।

निर्जरामरणा जातिर्भवेज्जायेत चांश्रुतः ॥ ३

B: If birth were before and aging/death after, there would be birth without aging/death and also without dying one would be born.

S: If birth [is regarded as] the former, and growing old and dying [are regarded as] coming into being later, then birth exists without growing old and dying, and [something] is born without death.

SB: Were birth before and death after, I would be immortal with no history.

G: If birth came first, and then old age and death, then birth would be ageless and deathless, and a deathless one would be born.

I: If birth is anterior and old age-death is posterior, then there will be birth without old age-death and this will entail the rise of a deathless being.

K: If birth were to come first and decay and death were to follow, then birth would be without decay and death, and an immortal would thus emerge.

पश्चाज्जातिर्यदि भवेज्जरामरणमादितः।

अहेतुकमजातस्य स्याज्जरामरणं कथं ॥ ४

B: If birth were after and aging/death before, how could there be an uncaused aging/death which has no birth?

S: If birth were later, and growing old and dying were earlier, how would there be an uncaused growing old and dying of something unborn?

SB: Were death first and birth later, The dead would be unborn.

G: If birth were to come after, and old age and death first, how could there be a causeless aging and death of one not born?

I: If birth is posterior and old age-death anterior, that would constitute a state of non-causal connection. For, of something yet to be born, how could there be old age-death?
K: If birth were to be posterior and decay-death anterior, then the latter would be without a cause. How could there be decay-death of one who is not born?

.न जरामरणेनैव जातिश्च सह युज्यते।

त्रियेत जायमानश्च स्याच्चाहेतुकतोभयोः ॥ ५

B: It is not suitable for birth and aging/death to be simultaneous; that which is being born would be dying and both would be without cause.

S: And a birth which is simultaneous with growing old and dying is likewise impossible; for, that which is being born would die, and both would be without cause.

SB: I cannot be born and die at once. If birth were death, They would both be unoriginated.

G: Birth and age and death cannot occur at one time. Then what is being born would be dying and both would occur without cause.

I: Indeed, birth is never conceived to be simultaneous with old age-death. For, what is in the process of being born must die and both life and death are non-causally related.

K: Indeed, decay-death as concomitant of birth is not proper. (In that case,) what is in the process of being born will also be dying and both would be rendered causeless.

.यत्र न प्रभवन्त्येते पूर्वापरसहक्रमाः।

प्रपञ्चयन्ति तां जातिं तज्जरामरणं च किं ॥ ६

B: Why fixate on that birth, that aging/dying, for which the phases of before, after, simultaneity are impossible?

S: Since the past, future, and simultaneous activity do not originate, to what purpose [do you] explain in detail [the existence of] birth, growing old and dying?

SB: Why am I transfixed by them?

G: When the series of the prior, simultaneous, and posterior is not possible, why are you led to posit this birth, aging, and death?

I: Where states of anterior, posterior, and simultaneity (of samsara) do not exist, how could the concepts of birth and old age-death be projected?

K: Wherever such methods (of discriminating) the prior, the posterior, and the simultaneous do not arise, why be obsessed by such birth and such decay-death.

.कार्यं च कारणं चैव लक्ष्यं लक्षणमेव च।

वेदना वेदकश्चैव सन्त्यर्था ये च के चन ॥ ७

B: It is not just samsara alone that has no before-extreme, cause and fruit themselves, and characteristics and the basis for characteristics themselves,

S: That which is produced and its cause, as well as the characteristic and that which is characterized, the sensation and the one who senses, and whatever other things there are –

G: Not only is cyclic existence itself without beginning, no existent has a beginning: neither cause and effect; nor character and characterized. . .

I: Cause and effect, characteristics and characterizations, feeler and feeling, and also whatever other things exist. . .

K: Effect and casue as well as characterized and characteristic, together with feeling and feeler or whatever fruits there are,

पूर्वा न विद्यते कोटिः संसारस्य न केवलं।

सर्वेषामपि भावानां पूर्वा कोटी न विद्यते ॥ ८

B: feeling and the feeler, whatever is suitable to bear meaning, also all things have no before-extreme.

S: Not only is the former limit of existence-in-flux (samsara) not to be found, but the former limit of all those things is not to be found.

G: nor feeling and the feeler; whatever there is: all entities are without beginning.

I: . . . not only is there not an anterior state in samsara but this state is not possible for all existences.

K: the prior end of these is not evident. Of the entire life-process as well as of all existents, the prior end is not evident.

दुःखपरीक्षा नाम द्वादशमं प्रकरणं

B: Investigation of Anguish

S: An Analysis of Sorrow (dukkha) (suffering)

G: Examination of Suffering

I: Examination of Suffering

K: Examination of Suffering

स्वयं कृतं परकृतं द्वाभ्यां कृतमहेतुकं।

दुःखमित्येक इच्छन्ति तच्च कार्यं न युज्यते ॥ १

B: Some assert that anguish arises from being made by self, made by other, by both, without cause. To do that is not suitable.

S: Some say: Sorrow (dukkha) is produced by oneself (i), or by another (ii), or by both [itself and another] (iii), or from no cause at all (iv); but [to consider] that [sorrow (dukkha)] as what is produced is not possible.

G: Some say suffering is self-produced, or produced from another or from both. Or that it arises without a cause. It is not the kind of thing to be produced.

I: Some assert that suffering arises by virtue of being self-caused, other-caused, both self and other-caused or non-causal. Such an assertion which treats suffering as an effect is not justifiable.

K: Some assume that suffering is self-caused, caused by another, caused by both or without a cause. (Suffering as) such an effect is indeed not appropriate.

स्वयं कृतं यदि भवेत्प्रतीत्य न ततो भवेत्।

स्कन्धानिमानमी स्कन्धाः संभवन्ति प्रतीत्य हि ॥ २

B: If it were made by self, therefore it would not be contingently arising, because those aggregates arise contingently on these aggregates.

S: If it were produced by itself (i.e. self-causation), it would not exist dependent on something else. Certainly those "groups of universal elements" (skandhas) exist presupposing these "groups."

SB: If anguish created itself, It would not be contingent, For the pain depends On what I'm doing now.

G: If suffering came from itself, then it would not arise dependently. For those aggregates arise in dependence on these aggregates.

I: If suffering is self-caused, it will not have a relational condition in arising. For, surely, these (present) skandhas are relationally conditioned in the arising of those (future) skandhas.

K: If (suffering were to be) self-caused, then it could not occur dependently. Indeed, depending upon these aggregates, these other aggregates occur.

यद्यमीभ्य इमे ऽन्ये स्युरेभ्यो वामी परे यदि।

भवेत्परकृतं दुःखं परैरेभिरमी कृताः ॥ ३

B: If that were other than this and if this were other than that, anguish would be made by other and that would be made by those others.

S: If these were different from those, or if those were different from these, sorrow (dukkha) would be produced by something other than itself (i.e. other-causation), because those would be made by these others.

SB: Were it other than me And I other than it, The pain would be caused By someone else.

G: If those were different from these, or if these were different from those, suffering could arise from another. These would arise from those others.

I: If these (present) skandhas are different from those (future) skandhas or if the latter are other than the former, then there will be suffering caused by something else and those (future) skandhas will also be caused by it.

K: If from these those that are different were to come to be, or if from those these different (things) were to come to be, then suffering would be caused by another, for these are caused by those that are different.

स्वपुद्गलकृतं दुःखं यदि दुःखं पुनर्विना।

स्वपुद्गलः स कतमो येन दुःखं स्वयं कृतं ॥ ४

B: If anguish were made by one's own person, who would that person be who has made anguish by himself, but is not included in the anguish?

S: If sorrow (dukkha) is made through one's own personality (i) (svapudgala), then one's own personality would be without sorrow (dukkha); who is that "own personality" by which sorrow (dukkha) is self-produced (i)?

SB: Who am I if I create My own suffering?

G: If suffering were caused by a person himself, then who is that person – by whom suffering is caused – who exists distinct from suffering?

I: If suffering is caused by the individual himself, then the individual is separated from suffering. Who is this individual self which self-causes suffering?

K: If suffering is caused by one's own person, then that own person can exist without suffering. Who is he by whom suffering is self-caused?

परपुद्गलजं दुःखं यदि यस्मै प्रदीयते।

परेण कृत्वा तद्दुःखं स दुःखेन विना कुतः ॥ ५

B: If anguish arose from another person, how could it be suitable for there to be [someone] not included in the anguish, who has been given it by another who made the anguish?

S: If sorrow (dukkha) were produced by a different personality (ii) (parapudgala), how would he, to whom is given that sorrow (dukkha) by another after he had produced it, be without sorrow (dukkha)?

SB: How can I be apart From pain I cause myself?

G: If suffering comes from another person, then who is that person – when suffering is given by another – who exists distinct from suffering?

I: If suffering is caused by another individual, where is this self which is separated from suffering but which is (seemingly) the recipient of the suffering caused by another?

K: If suffering were to be produced by one person and given over to another, that suffering is caused by the former. How can the latter be identified without suffering?

परपुद्गलजं दुःखं यदि कः परपुद्गलः।

विना दुःखेन यः कृत्वा परस्मै प्रहिणोति तत् ॥ ६

B: If anguish arose [from] another person, who would that other person be who, having made it, gives it to someone else, but is not included in the anguish?

S: If sorrow (dukkha) is produced by a different personality, who is that different personality who, while being without sorrow (dukkha), yet makes and transmits that [sorrow (dukkha)] to the other?

SB: Who am I if I can feel The suffering you create? Can I be apart From pain you cause me? Who are you who hurt me? How can you be apart From pain you cause me?

G: If another person causes suffering, who is that other one who bestowed that suffering, distinct from suffering?

I: If suffering is caused by another individual, what is (the nature of) this individual which is separated from and yet causes and bestows suffering to the recipient?

K: If suffering is caused by another person, who is that other person who, himself without suffering, causes it and bestows it on another?

स्वयं कृतस्याप्रसिद्धेर्दुःखं परकृतं कुतः।

परो हि दुःखं यत्कुर्यात्तत्तस्य स्यात्स्वयं कृतं ॥ ७

B: Since it is not established as made by self, how can anguish have been made by other? [For] whatever anguish is made by other, that has been made by his self.

S: It is not established that sorrow (dukkha) is self-produced (i), [but] how is [sorrow (dukkha)] produced by another (ii)? Certainly the sorrow (dukkha), which would be produced by another (ii), in his case would be self-produced (i').

SB: Anguish is not caused by me. How can it be caused by you? Anguish caused by you is caused by your me too.

G: When self-caused is not established, how could suffering be caused by another? Whoever caused the suffering of another must have caused his own suffering.

I: As self-cause cannot be established, where can an other-caused suffering be? For, surely, an other-caused suffering is caused by that other itself.

K: With the non-establishment of self-causation, how can there be suffering caused by another? For, indeed, if another were to cause that suffering, in relation to him it would be self-caused.

न तावत्स्वकृतं दुःखं न हि तेनैव तत्कृतं।

परो नात्मकृतश्चेत्स्याद्दुःखं परकृतं कथं ॥ ८

B: Anguish is not made [by] self; that is not made by that itself. If it is not made by an other self, how can anguish be made by other?

S: Sorrow (dukkha) is not self-produced (i), for that which is produced is certainly not produced by that [personality]. If the "other" (para) is not produced by the individual self (atma), how would sorrow (dukkha) be that produced by another?

SB: Suffering is not caused by me, For I do not cause myself. If uncaused by another me, How could it be caused by you?

G: No suffering is self-caused. Nothing causes itself. If another is not self-made, how could suffering be caused by another?

I: In truth then, there is no self-caused suffering for it cannot come about by itself. If an other does not bring about its own suffering, why is there an other-caused suffering?

K: So long as suffering is not self-caused, it is, indeed, not caused by oneself. If the other were not to do it by himself, how could suffering be caused by another?

स्याद्दुःखाभ्यां कृतं दुःखं स्यादेकैककृतं यदि।

पराकारास्वयंकारं दुःखमहेतुकं कुतः ॥ ९

B: If it is made by each, anguish would be made by both. Not made by self, not made by other, how can anguish have no cause?

S: Sorrow (dukkha) could be made by both [self and the "other"] (iii) if it could be produced by either one. [But] not produced by another, and not self-produced (iv) —how can sorrow (dukkha) exist without a cause?

SB: If both of us cause pain, Would not it be caused By we who have no part in it? Can anguish be uncaused?

G: If suffering were caused by each, suffering could be caused by both. Not caused by suffering or by other, how could suffering be uncaused?

I: If suffering could be caused individually by one's self and by an other, then there should also be suffering caused by itself nor by an other?

K: If suffering were to be caused by both, it would be caused by each individually. Whence can here be suffering that is caused neither by another nor by oneself and is without cause?

न केवलं हि दुःखस्य चातुर्विध्यं च विद्यते।

बाह्यानामपि भावानां चातुर्विध्यं न विद्यते ॥ १०

B: Not only does anguish alone not have the four aspects, external things too do not have the four aspects.

S: Not only are the four [causal] interpretations not possible in respect to sorrow (dukkha), [but also] none of the four [causal] interpretations is possible even in respect to external things (bhava).

SB: Suffering is nothing special. Even jugs and rolls of cloth Do not come from themselves, Others, both or nothing.

G: Not only does suffering not exist in any of the fourfold ways: no external entity exists in any of the fourfold ways.

I: Not only is the four-fold causal view of suffering impossible but the same is not possible with respect to the external elements of being.

K: It is not that the fourfold theory applied exclusively to suffering is not evident. The fourfold theory pertaining to other existents too is not evident.