

B = Stephen Batchelor? (according to internet site)

SB = Stephen Batchelor: VERSES FROM THE CENTER: A BUDDHIST VISION OF THE SUBLIME (New York: Riverhead Books, 2000)

S = Frederick J. Streng, EMPTINESS: A STUDY IN RELIGIOUS MEANING (New York: Abingdon Press, 1967), Appendix A & B; pp. 183-227

G = Jay L. Garfield, THE FUNDAMENTAL WISDOM OF THE MIDDLE WAY: NAGARAJUNA'S MULAMDHYAMAKAKARIKA (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995)

I = Kenneth K. Inada, NAGARJUNA: A TRANSLATION OF HIS MULAMADHYAMAKAKARIKA WITH AN INTRODUCTORY ESSAY (Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1970)

K= David J. Kalupahana, MULAMADHYAMAKAKARIKA OF NAGARJUNA: THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1986)

For an English translation of the karikas (virtually identical with G above) together with Je Tsongkhapa's commentary on them, consult Ngawang Samten and Jay L. Garfield (trans.), OCEAN OF REASONING: A GREAT COMMENTARY ON NAGARJUNA'S MULAMADHYAMAKAKARIKA (NY: Oxford University Press, 2006)

English translations centered immediately following the Sanskrit are from Lama Christie McNally's Bok Jinpa IX Diamond Mountain University course.

संस्कृतपरीक्षा सप्तमं प्रकरणम्

B: Investigation of Birth, Abiding and Perishing[Skt. title is "investigation of the compounded - samskrta"]

SB: Birth

S: Analysis of Composite Products (samskrta)

G: Examination of the Conditioned

I: Examination of the Created Realm of Existence

K: The Examination of the Conditioned

यदि संस्कृत उत्पादस्तत्र युक्ता त्रिलक्षणी ।

अथासंस्कृत उत्पादः कथं संस्कृतलक्षणं ॥१॥

7.1

If the starting of a thing
Was something that was made

It would have those
Three defining qualities

If the starting of a thing
Was not something that was made,
How could it have
A made thing's quality?

B: If birth were compounded, it would possess the three characteristics [of a compound]. If birth were uncompounded, how would it be a characteristic of a compound?

SB: Were birth conditioned It would be born and live and die Like all conditioned things. Were it unconditioned, How could it describe Conditioned things?

S: If origination (utpada) is a composite product, then the three characteristics [of existence: "origination," "duration," and "dissolution"] are appropriate.

But if origination is a non-composite (asamstrta), then how [could there be] characteristics of a composite product?

G: If arising were produced, Then it would also have the characteristics. If arising is not produced, How could the characteristics of the produced exist?

I: If origination is of the created nature, then the three characteristics (i.e., origination, duration, cessation) will prevail. But if origination is of the uncreated nature, how could it be a characteristic of the created?

K: If arising is conditioned, therein three characteristics are proper. If arising is unconditioned, how can there be characteristics of the conditioned?

उत्पादाद्यास्त्रयो व्यस्ता नालं लक्षणकर्माणि ।

संस्कृतस्य समस्ताः स्युरेकत्र कथमेकदा ॥२॥

7.2

The three defining qualities
Of something which is made—
It's starting and the rest—
Could not come about one at a time

Yet, how is it possible
For them to be contained

In a single object in
A single moment?

B: The three such as birth cannot individually be that which characterizes compounds. How is it possible for one at one time to be compounded [of all three]?

S: When the three are separate, origination of either of the other two characteristics does not suffice to function as a characteristic.

If united in a composite product, how could they all be at one place at one time?

G: If the three, arising, etc., are separate, They cannot function as the characteristics of the produced. But how could they be joined In one thing simultaneously?

I: When the three characteristics of origination, etc., are discrete, there will be no action in the characteristics with respect to the created nature. And if they are compounded or united, how could they occur at the same time in the same place?

K: When the triad consisting of arising, etc., are discrete, they are not adequate to function as characteristics of the conditioned. If they were to be combined, how can they be in the same place at the same time?

उत्पादस्थितिभङ्गानामन्यत्संस्कृतलक्षणं ।

अस्ति चेदनवस्थैवं नास्ति चेत्ते न संस्कृताः ॥३॥

7.3

If starting, staying, and stopping
Each possessed the qualities
Of something that was made,
It would be neverending

But if they do not, then
They can't be something that was made

B: If birth, abiding and perishing had an other characteristic of being compounded, this would be endless. If not, they would not be compounded.

S: If origination, duration, and dissolution are other [secondary] characteristics of composite products,

It is an infinite regress. If this is not so, they are not composite products.

G: If arising, abiding, and ceasing Have characteristics other than those of the produced, There would be an infinite regress. If they don't, they would not be produced.

I: If other characteristics of the created nature besides that of origination, duration, and cessation are permitted, then this process (of assigned characteristics) could go on *ad infinitum*. If they are not permitted, on the other hand, then they are not of the created nature.

K: If there were to be a characteristic of the conditioned other than arising, duration, and destruction, there would be infinite regress. If there were to be no such [characteristics], these would not be conditioned.

उत्पादोत्पाद उत्पादो मूलोत्पादस्य केवलं ।
उत्पादोत्पादमुत्पादो मौलो जनयते पुनः ॥४ ॥

7.4

The start of the starting

Starts

The overall starting

But the overall starting

Also starts

The start of the starting

B: The birth of birth gives birth to the root birth alone. The root birth also is that which gives birth to the birth of birth.

S: The "originating origination" (utpadotpada) (i.e. the beginning of the origination) is only the origination of the basic origination (mulotpada) (i.e. the beginning of the product);

Also the origination of the basic [origination] (i.e. the beginning of the beginning of the product) produces the "originating origination." (i.e. the beginning of the origination)

G: The arising of arising only gives rise To the basic arising. The arising of the basic arising Gives rise to arising.

I: The origination of origination is nothing but the arising of the primal origination. And of course the primal origination gives rise to the origination of origination.

K: The arising of arising is exclusively the arising of primary arising. Again, the primary arising produces the arising or arising.

उत्पादोत्पाद उत्पादो मूलोत्पादस्य ते यदि ।

मौलेनाजनितस्तं ते स कथं जनयिष्यति ॥५॥

7.5

Say its own start starting

Starts

The overall starting;

But until its overall starting

Starts *it*,

How could it start anything?

B: If your birth of birth gives birth to the root birth, how does that which is not yet born from your root give birth to that [root birth]?

S: But if, according to you, the originating origination (i.e. self-originating origination) produces basic origination, (i.e. also causes the beginning of the product)

How, according to you, will this [originating origination] (i.e. self-originating origination) produce that [basic origination] (i.e. the beginning of the product) if [it itself] is not produced by basic origination (i.e. the beginning of the product)?

G: If, as you say, the arising or arising Gives rise to the basic arising, How, according to you, does this, Not arisen from the basic arising, give rise to that?

I: If you say that the origination of origination is the arising of the primal origination, then how could it give rise to the primal origination, when it depends on the latter (for its own being) and has not yet arisen?

K: If arising of arising is the primary arising, not being produced by the primary, how can it [the former] produce that [the latter]?

स ते मौलेन जनितो मौलम् जनयते यदि ।

मौलः स तेनाजनितस्तमुत्पादयते कथम् ॥६॥

7.6

If its overall starting

Starts *it*,

And then the overall

Starting starts,

Then the overall starting

Has not yet been
Started by it—
So how could it start anything?

B: If that which is born from your root birth gives birth to the root, how does that root which is born from that give birth to that [from which it is born]?

S: If, according to you, that which has originated through basic [origination] (i.e. referring to the dependent originating origination) produces basic [origination], (i.e. like affirming that the effect exist before the cause)

How does the basic [origination], which is yet unproduced by that [originating origination] (i.e. self-originating origination), cause that [originating origination] (i.e. self-originating origination) to be originated?

G: If, as you say, that which is arisen from basic arising Gives rise to the basis, How does that nonarisen basis Give rise to it?

I: If you say that that which depends on the primal origination gives rise to the primal origination, then how could it give rise to the primal origination which in turn depends on the origination of origination and which has not yet arisen?

K: If, produced by the primary, it produces the primary, how can that primary, not produced by it, produce it?

अयमुत्पद्यमानस्ते काममुत्पादयेदिमं ।
यदीममुत्पादयितुमजातः शक्नुयादयं ॥७॥

7.7

If the one
Could start the other
Without itself having started,

You must believe
It starts it
While it's starting

B: If that which has not been born is able to give birth to that, that of yours which is being born should be able to give birth to that.

S: According to you, this, while originating, would certainly cause that to originate—
If this, not being produced, would be able to cause origination.

G: If this nonarisen Could give rise to that, Then, as you wish, It will give rise to that which is arising.

I: This so-called presently originating will, as you wish, cause an origination if that which has not arisen is capable of causing such an origination.

K: This, while arising, if it may so desire, produce that, so that it, being not yet born, will be able to produce that.

प्रदीपः स्वपरात्मानौ संप्रकाशयिता यथा ।

उत्पादः स्वपरात्मानावुत्पादयेत्तथा ॥८॥

7.8

Suppose just as a butter lamp
Lights both itself and the other things,
So too does the starting
Start itself and other things,

B: Just as lamplight illuminates itself and others, likewise birth too gives birth to both itself and the thing of others.

SB: Does birth give birth To itself and something else Like light illuminates Itself and something else?

S: [The opponent claim:]

As a light is the illuminator of both itself and that which is other than itself,
So origination would originate both itself and that which is other than itself.

G: Just as a butterlamp Illuminates itself as well as others, So arising gives rise to itself And to other arisen things.

I: As light illuminates both itself and other entities, so does origination give rise to both itself and others.

K: As a light illuminates itself as well as others, so does arising produce both itself and others.

प्रदीपे नान्धकारो ऽस्ति यत्र चासौ प्रतिष्ठितः ।

किं प्रकाशयति दीपः प्रकाशो हि तमोवधः ॥९॥

7.9

Wherever there's a butter lamp,

There the darkness cannot be.
So just what is it
That this lamp illuminates?
To illuminate is to dispel darkness

B: Wherever lamplight is present there is no darkness. What does lamplight illuminate? It illuminates by dispelling darkness.

S: [Nagarjuna answers:]
There is no darkness in the light and there where the light is placed.
What could the light illumine? Indeed illumination is the getting rid of darkness.

G: In the butterlamp and its place, There is no darkness. What then does the butterlamp illuminate? For illumination is the clearing of darkness.

I: There is no darkness in light or in its abode. What does light illumine when, indeed, it destroys darkness?

K: There exists no darkness either in the light or in whatever place it is situated. What does light illuminate? For, illumination is indeed the destruction of darkness.

कथमुत्पद्यमानेन प्रदीपेन तमो हतं ।
नोत्पद्यमानो हि तमः प्रदीपः प्राप्नुते यदा ॥१० ॥

7.10

If while the lamp is starting
It never touched darkness,
How can its act of starting
Ever dispel any darkness?

B: If, when lamplight is being generated, it does not encounter darkness, how does the generation of lamplight dispel darkness?

SB: Light illuminates By shedding darkness; Can light dispel A dark it never meets?

S: How is darkness destroyed by the light being originated,
When the light, being originated, does not come in contact with darkness?

G: If the arising butterlamp Does not reach darkness, How could that arising butterlamp Have cleared the darkness?

I: How could darkness be destroyed by a presently shining light? For, indeed, the presently shining light has not as yet extended over to darkness.

K: How can darkness be destroyed by the emergent light, when the emerging light, indeed, does not reach darkness?

अप्राप्यैव प्रदीपेन यदि वा निहतं तमः ।

इहस्थः सर्वलोकस्थं स तमो निहनिष्यति ॥११॥

7.11

And if the lamp
Dispels the darkness
Without ever touching it,

Then darknesses
Across the world
Would be dispelled
As surely as
The darkness in this place

B: If darkness is dispelled even though it does not encounter lamplight, this [lamplight] dwelling here would eliminate the darkness that dwells in all the worlds.

SB : Were darkness shed By light it never meets, A single lamp could lift The darkness of a galaxy.

S: But then, if darkness is destroyed by a light having no contact with [darkness], [A light] placed here will destroy the darkness of the entire world.

G: If the illumination of darkness occurs Without the butterlamp reaching darkness, All of the darkness in the world Should be illuminated.

I: If darkness is destroyed by light which is not extended, then light, in such a state, will destroy the whole world of darkness.

K: On the contrary, if darkness is destroyed by light without reaching it, then that [light] remaining here wil destroy the darkness present in all the worlds.

प्रदीपः स्वपरात्मानौ संप्रकाशयते यदि ।

तमोऽपि स्वपरात्मानौ छादयिष्यत्यसंशयं ॥१२ ॥

7.12

If a lamp illuminates
Both itself and other things,
No doubt darkness too
Would cover
Both itself and other things

B: If lamplight illuminated itself and the thing of others, darkness too would without doubt obscure itself and the thing of others.

SB: If light illuminates Itself and other things, Does the dark obscure Itself and other things?

S: If the light illuminated both itself and that which is other than itself,
Then, without a doubt, darkness will cover both itself and that which is other than itself.

G: If, when it is illuminated, The butterlamp illuminates itself and others, Darkness should, without a doubt, Conceal itself and others.

I: If light illumines both itself and other entities, then undoubtedly, darkness will also darken itself and other entities as well.

K: If light were to illuminate both itself and others, then certainly darkness too will conceal itself and others.

अनुत्पन्नोऽयमुत्पादः स्वात्मानं जनयेत्कथं ।

अथोत्पन्नो जनयते जाते किं जन्यते पुनः ॥१३ ॥

7.13

Before the starting starts,
How could it start itself?
After the starting's started
It's started already—
So what would it start?

B: How can unborn birth give birth to itself? If the born gives birth, when it has been born, what would be born?

SB: How can a child That's not yet born Give birth to itself?

S: If it has not yet originated, how does origination produce itself?

And if it has already originated, when it is being produced, what is produced after that which is already produced?

G: How could this arising, being nonarisen, Give rise to itself? And if it is arisen from another, Having arisen, what is the need for another arising?

I: How could an origination which has not arisen give rise to its own self? Again, if that which has arisen gives rise to itself, how could there be a rise again?

K: How can this non-arisen arising produce itself? If it is the arisen that produces, then being born, what is it that is produced again?

नोत्पद्यमानं नोत्पन्नं नानुत्पन्नं कथं चन ।

उत्पद्यते तथाख्यातं गम्यमानगतागतैः ॥१४ ॥

7.14

Whether it's started
Or it hasn't, or
It's in the midst of starting,
Any way you look at it
It cannot start a thing.

We covered this before
With going, not going, and walking

B: The born and the unborn, the being born do not in any way give birth. That has been explained by the gone, not gone and going.

SB: What has been born, What's not yet born And what is being born Do not give birth.

S: In no way does anything originate
by what is being originated (ii),
by what is already originated (iii),
or by what is not yet originated (i)—

Just as it has been said in [the analysis of] "presently going to (ii)," "that which is already gone to (i)" and "that which is not yet gone to (iii)."

G: The arisen, the nonarisen, and that which is arising Do not arise in any way at all. Thus they should be understood Just like the gone, the not-gone, and the going.

I: In no way is it possible that origination rises from presently arising, that which has arisen, or that which has not arisen. This (line of argument) has already been discussed with respect to *gamyamana*, *gata*, and *agata*.

K: Neither the present arising, nor the arisen, nor the non-arisen, is being arisen in any way. This has already been explained by means of [the concepts of] present moving, the moved and the not yet moved.

उत्पद्यमानमुत्पत्ताविदं न क्रमते यदा ।
कथमुत्पद्यमानं तु प्रतीत्योत्पत्तिमुच्यते ॥१५ ॥

7.15

If you're at the point of starting
That's no longer in the midst of starting
How then could you ever say
"In the midst of starting"
Which has to rest upon the starting?

B: When being born does not arise in what is born, then how can one say "[it is] being born in dependence on the born"?

S: When, in that-which-is-originated (iii), there is nothing which activates that which is being originated (ii),
How can one say: That which is being originated (ii) [exists] presupposing that which is produced?

G: When there is arising but not yet That which is arising, How can we say that that which is arising Depends on this arising?

I: When this presently arising does not proceed from the origination, how can it be said that the former depends on the latter?

K: When this present arising does not proceed from within arising, indeed, how can the present arising be spoken of as dependent arising?

प्रतीत्य यद्यद्भवति तत्तच्छान्तं स्वभावतः ।
तस्मादुत्पद्यमानं च शान्तमुत्पत्तिरेव च ॥१६ ॥

7.16

All that arises in dependence

Is in essence peace
So being in the midst of starting
And starting too
Are peace itself.

B: Whatever is dependently arising, that is by nature pacified. Therefore, being born and what is born too are pacified.

SB: Everything contingent Is naturally at ease.

S: Whatever comes into existence presupposing something else is without self-existence (stabhava).

[As there is] an allayment of "being originated," so [also] of that which is originated (iii).

G: Whatever is dependently arisen, Such a thing is essentially peaceful. Therefore that which is arising and arising itself Are themselves peaceful.

I: Any entity which exists by virtue of relational origination is quiescence in itself. Therefore, presently arising and origination per se are likewise in the nature of quiescence.

K: Whatever that comes to be dependently, that is inherently peaceful. Therefore, that which is presently arising as well as arising itself are peaceful.

यदि कश्चिदनुत्पन्नो भावः संविद्यते क्व चित् ।
उत्पद्येत स किं तस्मिन्भाव उत्पद्यतेऽसति ॥१७॥

7.17

If there could be
A working thing
That hadn't started yet,
Could you find it anywhere?

But if there did not exist
A *thing* that could be started,
What could ever start?

B: If any unborn thing existed anywhere, on being born that [unborn] thing would not exist. If so, what would be born?

S: If some particular thing which is not yet originated (i) is indeed known to exist,

That thing will be originated. What originates if it does not exist?

G: If a nonarisen entity Anywhere exists, That entity would have to arise. But if it were nonexistent, what could arise?

I: If an entity which has not arisen is granted to exist somewhere, then it would originate. But how could this entity, when it actually does not exist, originate?

K: If a certain non-arisen existent is evident somewhere, then that would arise. When such a thing does not exist, how can an existent arise?

उत्पद्यमानमुत्पादो यदि चोत्पादयत्ययं ।
उत्पादयेत्तमुत्पादमुत्पादः कतमः पुनः ॥१८ ॥

7.18

If the starting

Is what starts

Being in the midst of starting,

What kind of starting

Acts to start *that* starting?

B: If that which has been born gives birth to what is being born, what [other thing] that has been born would be giving birth to that which has been born?

S: And if the origination originates that which is being originated (ii),
What origination, in turn, would originate that origination? (i.e. infinite regress)

G: If this arising Gave rise to that which is arising, By means of what arising Does that arising arise?

I: If origination gives rise to the presently arising, then again, what kind of origination will now give rise to the (first type of) origination?

K: If arising were to produce this present arising, which arising would again produce that arising of that arising?

अन्य उत्पादयत्येनं यद्युत्पादोऽनवस्थितिः ।
अथानुत्पाद उत्पन्नः सर्वमुत्पद्यते तथा ॥१९ ॥

7.19

If another starting started it,
We'd go on like that forever;

If there was a start
That had no start,
It could just as well
Start everything

B: If another [thing] that has been born gives birth [to it], this would be endless. If it is born without [another] which has been born [OR if it is born without being born], everything would be born like that [i.e. causelessly].

S: If another origination originates that [origination], there will be an infinite regress of originations.

But if non-origination is that which is origination, then everything [without qualification] would originate.

G: If another arising gives rise to this one, There would be an infinite regress. If something nonarisen is arisen, Then all things could arise in this way.

I: If another (origination) gives rise to this (first) origination, then origination will go on *ad infinitum*. But if that which has arisen arises from non-origination, then everything will arise in such a way.

K: If this arising were to produce another, arising would turn out to be infinite regression. If the non-arising is arisen, then it will produce everything in this manner.

सतश्च तावदुत्पत्तिरसतश्च न युज्यते ।

न सतश्चासतश्चेति पूर्वमेवोपपादितं ॥२०॥

7.20

Whether a thing exists or not,
Its starting is impossible

What I said before is true:
It's not that things exist in truth
Nor do they truly not exist.

B: Thus it is not reasonable for what exists or does not exist to be born. It has been shown above that there is no existent or non-existent.

S: It is not possible that what has originated either exists or does not exist,
Nor that what has not originated either exists or does not exist; this has been demonstrated earlier.

G: Neither an existent nor a nonexistent Can be properly said to arise. As it is taught before with 'For neither an existent nor an nonexistent.'

I: Indeed, an origination relative to either being or non-being cannot be justified. Nor it is possible with being and non-being (at the same time). This has been demonstrated before. [note: reference is to Chapter 1, Verses 6 & 7]

K: As such, neither the arising of an existent nor the arising of a non-existent is proper. Even so is the arising of that which is both existent and non-existent, and this has been previously explained.

निरुध्यमानस्योत्पत्तिर्न भावस्योपपद्यते ।
यश्चानिरुध्यमानस्तु स भावो नोपपद्यते ॥२१॥

7.21

It's not true that
A thing is starting
While it's in the midst
Of stopping

But anything that
Was not stopping
Couldn't be a thing

.B: It is not tenable for a thing that is perishing to be born. It is not tenable for that which is not perishing to be a thing.

S: The origination of something being destroyed is not possible;
And whatever is not being destroyed, that entity is not possible.

G: The arising of a ceasing thing Is not tenable. But to say that it is not ceasing Is not tenable for anything.

I: Origination of a presently extinguishing entity is impossible Moreover, it is equally impossible for a presently non-extinguishing entity.

K: The arising of an existent that is ceasing is not appropriate. Whatever existent that is non-arising, that existent too is not appropriate.

न स्थितभावस्तिष्ठत्यस्थितभावो न तिष्ठति ।
न तिष्ठति तिष्ठमानः कोऽनुत्पन्नश्च तिष्ठति ॥२२॥

7.22

A thing that lasts
Could never stay.
But if it doesn't last
It couldn't stay.
It can't stay
Even in the midst
Of staying.
What could stay
Which hasn't begun?

B: A thing that has remained does not remain. A thing that has not [yet] remained does not remain. That which is remaining also does not remain. What unborn [thing] can remain?

S: Neither an "entity that has endured (iii)" (sthitabhava) nor an "entity that has not endured (i)" endures;

Not even something enduring (ii) endures.
And what endures if it is not originated?

G: A static existent does not endure. A nonstatic existent does not endure. Stasis does not endure. What nonarisen can endure?

I: An entity which has arisen does not abide (i.e., endure) nor does an entity which has not arisen. A presently enduring entity also does not abide. How could something without origination abide?

K: An existent that has endured is not stationary, nor is an existent that has not endured. The presently enduring is not stationary. What non-arisen can stay?

स्थितिर्निरुध्यमानस्य न भावस्योपपद्यते ।
यश्चानिरुध्यमानस्तु स भावो नोपपद्यते ॥२३॥

7.23

You couldn't say
It's a lasting thing
When it's in the midst
Of stopping

But anything not
In the midst of stopping
Couldn't be a functioning thing.

B: It is not possible for a thing that is perishing to remain. It is not possible for that which is not perishing to be a thing.

S: Duration is not possible of a thing that is being destroyed.
But whatever is not being destroyed, that thing (bhava) is [also] not possible.

G: The endurance of a ceasing entity Is not tenable. But to say that it is not ceasing Is not tenable for anything.

I: The abiding of a presently extinguishing entity is impossible. Indeed, the abiding of a presently non-extinguishing entity is equally impossible.

K: Duration of an existent that is ceasing is not appropriate. Whatever existent that is non-ceasing is also not appropriate.

जरामरणधर्मेषु सर्वभावेषु सर्वदा ।

तिष्ठन्ति कतमे भावा ये जरामरणं विना ॥२४ ॥

7.24

If all functioning things
Are things which
Constantly get old and die,

Where is the functioning thing
Which lasts—
A thing that doesn't
Get old or die?

B: If all things at all times are aging and dying phenomena, what things are there which could remain without aging and dying?

SB: When everyone is dying, Can I be born and live? Could I live, But neither age nor die?

S: Because every entity always [remains in] the law of old age and death,
What entities are there which endure without old age and death?

G: Inasmuch as the nature of all things Is aging and death, Without aging and death, What existents can endure?

I: As all entities are always subject of the conditions (i.e., *dharmas*) of aging and death, what entities abide which are not subject to the conditions?

K: When all existents are always of the nature of decay and death, which existents that are without decay and death can stay?

स्थित्यान्वया स्थितेः स्थानं तयैव च न युज्यते ।
उत्पादस्य यथोत्पादो नात्मना न परात्मना ॥२५॥

7.25

Just as starting
Can't start itself
And can't be started
By something else,

It's impossible
For something that lasts
To last itself
Or be lasted
By some other lasting.

B: It is not reasonable for what remains to remain due to something else that remains or due to itself. This is like how what has been born is not given birth to by itself or another. [cf. v.18-19]

S: The enduring quality of a different duration is as impossible as of that same duration,
So the origination of origination is neither itself nor that which is other than itself.

G: Stasis cannot endure through itself Or through another stasis. Just as arising cannot arise from itself Or from another arising.

I: The abiding state of an entity is not justifiable on the grounds of another entity's abiding or by its own abiding. This is just as the origination of origination which is dependent neither on its own self nor on another.

K: The endurance of an enduring thing based on the endurance of itself or of another is not proper. It is like the absence of arising of arising, either from itself or from another.

निरुध्यते नानिरुद्धं न निरुद्धं निरुध्यते ।
तथापि निरुध्यमानं किमजातं निरुध्यते ॥२६ ॥

7.26

A thing that stops
Could never stop

But without stopping
It couldn't stop
It can't stop
Even in the midst
Of stopping

What could stop
Which hasn't begun?

B: What has ceased does not cease. What has not ceased also does not cease. Likewise what is ceasing also does not. What unborn [thing] can cease? [cf. v. 22]

SB: The living are not the dying Nor the unliving the dying. Neither milk nor butter Causes milk to cease.

S: "That which has ceased (iii)" (niruddha) does not cease; and "that which has not ceased (i)" does not cease;

Nor even "that which is ceasing (ii)."

For, what can cease [if it is] produced? (i.e. or if it is not really produced?)

G: The ceasing of what has ceased does not happen. What has not yet ceased does not cease. Nor does that which is ceasing. What nonarisen can cease?

I: That which has not extinguished does not extinguish. That which has extinguished does not extinguish also. This is also the case with that which is presently extinguishing. How could an entity which has not arisen extinguish itself?

K: That which has not ceased does not cease. That which has ceased also does not cease. Even so is that which is ceasing. Is it the unborn that ceases?

स्थितस्य तावद्भावस्य निरोधो नोपपद्यते ।
नास्थितस्यापि भावस्य निरोध उपपद्यते ॥२७ ॥

7.27

Any thing
That lasted
Couldn't stop

Any thing
That didn't last
Couldn't stop either

B: It is not possible for a thing which has remained to cease. It is also not possible for a thing which has not remained to cease.

S: Therefore cessation of an enduring entity is not possible.
Moreover, cessation of a non-enduring entity is not possible.

G: The cessation of what is static Is not tenable. Nor is the cessation of Something not static tenable.

I: In truth, the cessation of an abiding entity is not possible. Also, the cessation of a non-abiding entity is not possible.

K: The cessation of an existent that has endured is not appropriate. The cessation of an existent that has not endured is also not appropriate.

तयैवावस्थयावस्था न हि सैव निरुध्यते ।
अन्ययावस्थयावस्था न चान्यैव निरुध्यते ॥२८ ॥

7.28

It couldn't ever be
That a certain length of time
Came to an end
All by itself

And it couldn't ever be
That this period of time

Was ended by
Another length of time

B: A particular state [of something] does not cause that particular state itself to cease. Moreover, another particular state does not cause that particular state to cease.

S: Indeed, a state [of existence] does not cease because of this state;
And a different state [of existence] does not cease because of a different state.

G: Being static does not cease Through being static itself. Nor does being static cease Through another instance of being static.

I: From its abiding state, surely, the same state does not extinguish itself. Also, from another abiding state, that state does not extinguish itself.

K: Indeed, a certain state [of existence] does not cease from a state identical with its own. Nor does a state [of existence] cease from another state different from its own.

यदैवं सर्वधर्माणामुत्पादो नोपपद्यते ।
तदैवं सर्वधर्माणां निरोधो नोपपद्यते ॥२९॥

7.29

When the start
Of any thing
Becomes impossible,

That's when the end
Of any thing
Is equally impossible

B: When the birth of all phenomena is not possible, then the cessation of all phenomena is not possible.

S: So, if the production of all dharmas is not possible,
Then neither is the cessation of all (i.e. any?) dharmas possible.

G: When the arising of any entity Is not tenable, Then the cessation of any entity Is not tenable.

I: As the origination of all *dharmas* (i.e., factors of existence) is not possible, so, also, is the cessation of all *dharmas*.

K: Indeed, when the arising of all things is not appropriate, then the cessation of all things is also not appropriate.

सतश्च तावद्भावस्य निरोधो नोपपद्यते ।
एकत्वे न हि भावश्च नाभावश्चोपपद्यते ॥३० ॥

7.30

If a thing exists,
Then it couldn't ever stop.
But if it's just one thing,
It can't both
Exist *and* not exist

B: Cessation is not possible in an existent thing. Thingness and nothingness are not possible in one.

SB: Something real would never die; Something can't be nothing.

S: Therefore cessation of a real existing entity is not possible;
And certainly both an existing entity and a non-existing entity cannot be possible in the same case.

G: For an existent thing Cessation is not tenable. A single thing being an entity and A nonentity is not tenable.

I: In truth, the cessation of a real existing entity is not possible. For, indeed, it is not possible to have the nature of existence and non-existence at the same time.

K: Furthermore, the cessation of a real existent is not appropriate. Indeed, in the context of identity, neither existence nor non-existence is appropriate.

असतोऽपि न भावस्य निरोध उपपद्यते ।
न द्वितीयस्य शिरस च्छेदनं विद्यते यथा ॥३१ ॥

7.31

But if a thing did not exist,
It also couldn't stop:
How could you cut off
A purple elephant's two heads?

B: Cessation is not possible also in what is not a thing. This is similar to how there is no cutting off a second head. [i.e. a person cannot be beheaded twice]

SB: Nothing too would never die: You can't behead a person twice.

S: Even more, cessation of a non-real existing entity is not possible.
Just as there is no second decapitation!

G: Moreover, for a nonentity, Cessation would be untenable. Just as a second beheading Cannot be performed.

I: The cessation of an unreal existing entity is also not possible. It is as if the severance of a second head (of a person) is inconceivable.

K: The cessation of an unreal existent is also not appropriate, just as a second beheading [of a person] is not evident.

न स्वात्मना निरोधोऽस्ति निरोधो न परात्मना ।
उत्पादस्य यथोत्पादो नात्मना न परात्मना ॥३२॥

7.32

Stopping can't happen
All by itself
Nor is it triggered by
Some other stopping;

Just like starting
Doesn't start
All by itself, or
By anything else

B: Cessation does not exist by its own self, nor does cessation [exist] by something else. This is like how what has been born is not given birth to by itself or another [cf. 25]

S: There is no cessation by means of itself; nor cessation by something other than itself;
Just as there is no origination of origination by itself nor by another.

G: Cessation does not cease by means of itself. Nor does it cease by means of another. Just as arising cannot arise from itself Or from another arising.

I: There is no cessation by itself or by another entity. It is just as the origination of origination does not arise by itself or by another.

K: There is no cessation by itself or by another entity, just as the arising of arising is neither by itself nor by another.

उत्पादस्थितिभङ्गानामसिद्धेर्नास्ति संस्कृतं ।
संस्कृतस्याप्रसिद्धौ च कथं सेत्स्यत्यसंस्कृतं ॥३३॥

7.33

Since nothing starts
And nothing stays
And nothing ever stops,

Nothing's ever made.

So made things
Do not exist.

And however could
An unmade thing exist?

B: Because birth and remaining and perishing are not established, there is no conditioned. Because the conditioned is utterly unestablished, how can the unconditioned be established?

S: Because the existence of production, duration, and cessation is not proved, there is no composite product (samskrta);

And if a composite product is not proved, how can a non-composite product (asamskrta) be proved?

G: Since arising, ceasing, and abiding Are not established, there are no compounded things. If all compounded things are unestablished, How could the uncompounded be established?

I: As the establishment of origination, duration and cessation is not possible there is no created realm. Without the establishment of the created realm, how then will the uncreated realm come about?

K: With the non-establishment of arising, duration, and destruction, the conditioned does not exist. With the non-establishment of the conditioned, how could there be the unconditioned?

यथा माया यथा स्वप्नो गन्धर्वनगरं यथा ।
तथोत्पादस्तथा स्थानंतथा भङ्ग उदाहृतं ॥३४ ॥

7.34

It's just as Lord Buddha spoke:

The way things start
The way they last
And the way they end

Are just a dream
Just an illusion
Just a city
Full of ghosts

.B: Like a dream, like a magician's illusion, like a city of gandharvas, likewise birth and likewise remaining, likewise perishing are taught.

S: As a magic trick, a dream or a fairy castle.
Just so should we consider origination, duration, and cessation.

G: Like a dream, like an illusion, Like a city of Gandharvas, So have arising, abiding, And ceasing been explained.

I: It is like an illusion, a dream, or an imaginary city in the sky. In such a way, (the concepts of) origination, duration and cessation have been described.

K: As an illusion, a dream, a city of the *gandharvas*, so have arising, endurance and destruction been exemplified.