

B = Stephen Batchelor (according to internet site)

SB = Stephen Batchelor: VERSES FROM THE CENTER: A BUDDHIST VISION OF THE SUBLIME (New York: Riverhead Books, 2000)

S = Frederick J. Streng, EMPTINESS: A STUDY IN RELIGIOUS MEANING ( New York: Abingdon Press, 1967), Appendix A & B; pp. 183-227

G = Jay L. Garfield, THE FUNDAMENTAL WISDOM OF THE MIDDLE WAY: NAGARAJUNA'S MULAMADHYAMAKAKARIKA (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995)

I = Kenneth K. Inada, NAGARJUNA: A TRANSLATION OF HIS MULAMADHYAMAKAKARIKA WITH AN INTRODUCTORY ESSAY (Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1970)

K= David J. Kalupahana, MULAMADHYAMAKAKARIKA OF NAGARJUNA: THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1986)

For an English translation of the karikas (virtually identical with G above) together with Je Tsongkhapa's commentary on them, consult Ngawang Samten and Jay L. Garfield (trans.), OCEAN OF REASONING: A GREAT COMMENTARY ON NAGARJUNA'S MULAMADHYAMAKAKARIKA (NY: Oxford University Press, 2006)

## संस्कारपरीक्षा नाम त्रयोदशमं प्रकरणं

samskāraparīkṣā nāma trayodaśamaṁ prakaraṇam

B: Investigations of Samskaras (Change)

SB: Change

S: An Analysis of Conditioned Elements (samskara)

G: Examination of Compounded Phenomena

I: Examination of Mental Conformation

K: Examination of Action and the Agent

तन्मृषा मोषधर्मं यद्भगवानित्यभाषत।

सर्वे च मोषधर्माणः संस्कारास्तेन ते मृषा ॥ १

tanmṛṣā moṣadharmā yadbhagavānityabhāṣata |  
sarve ca moṣadharmāṇaḥ saṁskārāstena te mṛṣā | | 1

B: The Bhagavan said that whatever dharma is deceptive, that is false. All conditions [are] deceptive dharmas, thus they are false.

S: A thing of which the basic elements are deception is vain, as the glorious one said. All conditioned elements (samskara) are things that have basic elements (dharma) which are deception; therefore, they are vain.

G: The Victorious Conqueror has said that whatever is deceptive is false. Compounded phenomena are all deceptive. Therefore they are all false.

I: The Blessed One has said that elements with delusive nature are untrue. All mental conformations are delusive in nature. Therefore, they are untrue.

K: The Blessed One has said that whatever is of deceptive nature, that is delusion. All things that are of deceptive nature involve dispositions. Therefore they are delusions.

तन्मृषा मोषधर्म यद्यदि किं तत्र मुष्यते।

एतत्तूक्तं भगवता शून्यतापरिदीपकं ॥ २

tanmṛṣā moṣadharmā yadyadi kiṁ tatra muṣyate |  
etattūktaṁ bhagavatā śūnyatāparidīpakaṁ | | 2

B: If whatever is a deceptive phenomenon is false, what is deceptive about it [in what way is it deceptive]? That statement by the Bhagavan is a complete presentation of emptiness.

S: "If that which has deceptive basic elements is vain, what is there which deceives?" This was spoken by the glorious one to illuminate "emptiness."

G: If whatever is deceptive is false, What deceives? The Victorious Conqueror has said about this that emptiness is completely true.

I: If the elements with deusive nature are untrue, what is there which deludes? On account of this the Blessed One merely expounded the significance of *shunyata*.

K: If whatever that is of deceptive nature is delusion, what is it about which there is delusion? That too, namely, that which illuminates emptiness, has been spoken of by the Blessed One.

भावानां निःस्वभावत्वमन्यथाभावदर्शनात्।

अस्वभावो भावो नास्ति भावानां शून्यता यतः ॥ ३

bhāvānām niḥsvabhāvatvamanyathābhāvadarśanāt |  
asvabhāvo bhāvo nāsti bhāvānām śūnyatā yataḥ || 3

B: Things have no essential nature because they are seen to change into something else. Things do not lack an essential nature because things are emptiness.

S: [An opponent says:] There is non-self-existence of things [since] a thing, by observation, [becomes] something else. (i.e. impermanence. A thing without self-existence does not exist—due to the emptiness of existing things.

G: All things lack entity (hood), Since change is perceived. There is nothing without entity Because all things have emptiness.

I: From the perception of varying natures all entities are without self-natures. An entity without self-nature does not exist because all entities have the nature of *shunyata*.

K: Because of the perception of change, the absence of self-nature of existents is [recognized]. Because of the emptiness of existents, there is no existent without self-nature.

कस्य स्यादन्यथाभावः स्वभावश्चेन्न विद्यते।

कस्य स्यादन्यथाभावः स्वभावो यदि विद्यते ॥ ४

kasya syādanyathābhāvaḥ svabhāvaścenna vidyate |  
kasya syādanyathābhāvaḥ svabhāvo yadi vidyate || 4

B: If there were no essential nature, whose [nature] would it be to change into something else? If there were an essential nature, how would it be possible to change into something else?

SB: If something has an essence—How can it ever change Into anything else?

S: If self-existence does not exist, whose "other-existence" would there be?  
[Nagarjuna answers:] If self-existence does exist, whose "other-existence" would there be?

G: If there is no entity (hood), What changes? If there were entity, How could it be correct that something changes?

I: If self-nature does not exists, what is it that has this varying nature? (On the other hand), if self-nature does exist, again, what is it that has this varying nature?

K: Whose change would there be, if self-nature were not evident? Again, whose change would there be, if self nature were evident?

तस्यैव नान्यथाभावो नाप्यन्यस्यैव युज्यते ।

युवा न जीर्यते यस्माद्यस्माज्जीर्णो न जीर्यते ॥ ५

tasyaiva nānyathābhāvo nāpyanyasyaiva yujyate ।  
yuvā na jīryate yasmādyasmājjirṇo na jīryate ॥ 5

B: This itself does not change into something else. The other itself too does not [either]. Because youth does not age. Because age too does not age.

SB: A thing doesn't change into something else – Youth does not age, Age does not age.

S: Just as there is no other-existence of a thing, so also [an-other-existence] of something else is not possible—Since a youth is not aging (jiryate), and since "who has already aged" is not aging (jiryate).

G: A thing itself does not change. Something different does not change. Because a young man doesn't grow old, And because an old man doesn't grow old either.

I: It is not possible for this or another entity to have a varying nature. This is from the fact that youth does not age (over again).

K: Neither change of something in itself not of something different is proper. The reason being that a youth does not age, nor does an aged person age.

तस्य चेदन्यथाभावः क्षीरमेव भवेद्दधि ।

क्षीरादन्यस्य कस्य चिद्दधिभावो भविष्यति ॥ ६

tasya cedanyathābhāvaḥ kṣīrameva bhaveddadhi ।  
kṣīrādanyasya kasya ciddadhibhāvo bhaviṣyati ॥ 6

B: If this itself changes into something else, milk itself would be curds. Something other than milk would be the being of curds.

SB: If something changed into something else – Milk would be butter Or butter would not be milk.

S: If there would be an other-existence of a thing, milk would exist as curds. [But] surely "being curds" will be something other than milk.

G: If a thing itself changed, Milk itself would be curd. Or curd would have come to be An entity different from milk.

I: If an entity does have a varying nature, then it will be possible for milk to become butter. But butter-nature will have to arise in something other than milk.

K: If change were to be of something in itself, then milk itself would be butter. Butter-ness would then be something other than milk.

यद्यशून्यं भवेत्किं चित्तस्याच्चून्यमिति किं चन।

न किं चिदस्त्यशून्यं च कुतः शून्यं भविष्यति ॥ ७

yadyaśūnyaṃ bhavetkiṃ citsyāccūnyamiti kiṃ cana |  
na kiṃ cidastyāśūnyaṃ ca kutaḥ śūnyaṃ bhaviṣyati || 7

B: If a bit of the non-empty existed, a bit of the empty would also exist. If there did not exist a bit of the non-empty, how could the empty exist?

SB: Were there a trace of something, There would be a trace of emptiness. Were there no trace of anything, There would be no trace of emptiness.

S: If something would be non-empty, something would [logically also] be empty. But nothing is non-empty, so how will it become empty?

G: If there were even a trifle nonempty, Emptiness itself would be but a trifle. But not even a trifle is nonempty. How could emptiness be an entity?

I: If something devoid of the nature of *shunya* exists, then there also will be something else which may have the nature of *shunya*. But as anything devoid of the nature of *shunya* does not exist, how could there exist the nature of *shunya*?

K: If there were to be something non-empty, there would then be something called empty. However, there is nothing that is non-empty. How could there be something empty?

शून्यता सर्वदृष्टीनां प्रोक्ता निःसरणं जिनैः ।

येषां तु शून्यतादृष्टिस्तानसाध्यान् बभाषिरे ॥ ८

śūnyatā sarvadṛṣṭīnām proktā niḥsaraṇam jinaiḥ ।  
yeṣāṃ tu śūnyatādrṣṭīstānasādhyān babhāṣire ॥ 8

B: The Conquerors taught emptiness as the forsaking of all views. Those who view emptiness are taught to be without realisation [incurable/incorrigible].

SB: Buddhas say emptiness Is relinquishing opinions. Believers in emptiness Are incurable.

S: Emptiness is proclaimed by the victorious one as the refutation of all viewpoints; But those who hold "emptiness" as a viewpoint—[the true perceivers] have called those "incurable" (asadhya).

G: The victorious ones have said That emptiness is the relinquishing of all views. For whomever emptiness is a view, That one will accomplish nothing.

I: The wise men (i.e., enlightened ones) have said that *shunya* or the nature of thusness is the relinquishing of all false views. Yet it is said that those who adhere to the idea or concept of *shunyata* are incorrigible.

K: The Victorious Ones have announced that emptiness is the relinquishing of all views. Those who are possessed of the view of emptiness are said to be incorrigible.

संसर्गपरीक्षा नाम चतुर्दशमं प्रकरणं

samsargaparīkṣā nāma caturdaśamaṃ prakaraṇam

B: Investigation of Connections

SB: Connection

S: An Analysis of Unification (samsarga)

G: Examination of Connection

I: Examination of Combination or Union

K: Examination of Association

द्रष्टव्यं दर्शनं द्रष्टा त्रीण्येतानि द्विशो द्विशः ।

सर्वशश्च न संसर्गमन्योन्येन व्रजन्त्युत ॥ १

draṣṭavyaṁ darśanaṁ draṣṭā trīṇyetaṇi dviśo dviśaḥ ।  
sarvaśaśca na saṁsargamanyonyena vrajantiyuta ।। 1

B: The seen, the seeing and the seer: these three do not mutually connect [as] pairs or all [together].

SB: I the beholder, The one I behold, The beholding itself Do not connect with one another.

S: That which is seen, sight, and the "seer": these three  
Do not combine together either in pairs or altogether.

G: The seen, seeing, and the seer: These three – pairwise or All together – Do not connect to one another.

I: The three phases of the object perceived, the perceiving function, and the perceiver cannot mutually combine in two-fold senses or all together. [note: The twofold senses refer to: 1) the object and the perceiving function, 2) the perceiving function and the perceiver, and 3) the perceiver and the object.]

K: The object of seeing, the seeing and the seer – these three do not function in mutual association either in pairs or all together.

एवं रागश्च रक्तश्च रञ्जनीयं च दृश्यतां ।

त्रैधेन शेषाः क्लेशाश्च शेषाण्यायतनानि च ॥ २

evaṁ rāgaśca raktaśca rañjanīyaṁ ca dṛśyatāṁ ।  
traidhena śeṣāḥ kleśāśca śeṣāṇyāyatanāni ca ।। 2

B: Likewise desire, desiring and the desired, the remaining afflictions and also the remaining sense-fields do [not connect] by three aspects.

SB: Just as I who desire, The one I desire, The desiring itself Do not connect.

S: Desire, the one who desires, and the object of desire have to be regarded in the same way, [As also] the impurities which remain and the three kinds of "base of sense" (ayatana) which remain.

G: Similarly desire, the desirous one, the object of desire, And the remaining afflictions And the remaining sources of perception Are understood in this threefold way.

I: The passion, impassioned self, and the impassionable can be seen in the same manner. The rest of the *kleshas* (i.e., mental defilements) and *ayatanas* (i.e., seats of sense perceptions) depends on these three phases (for exposition).

K: Lust, the lustful as well as the object of lust should be seen in the same way. The remaining defilements as well as the remaining spheres of sense should be seen in the triadic mode.

अन्येनान्यस्य संसर्गस्तच्चान्यत्वं न विद्यते।

द्रष्टव्यप्रभृतीनां यन्न संसर्गं व्रजन्त्यतः ॥ ३

anyenānyasya saṃsargastaccānyatvaṃ na vidyate |  
draṣṭavyaprabhṛtīnāṃ yanna saṃsargaṃ vrajantyaataḥ || 3

B: If the other connects to the other, because the seen and so forth do not exist [as] other, therefore there is no connection.

SB: We do not connect Because we are not Apart from one another; We would not be together.

S: [Some hold:] There is unification (samsarga) of one different thing with another different thing; [but] since the differentness Of what is seen, etc. does not exist, those [factors] do not enter into unification.

G: Since things connect to one another, But in seeing, etc., There is no difference, they cannot connect.

I: There is combination of something with something different. But there are (essentially) no different natures in the object perceived, etc., and these, therefore, cannot coalesce.

K: Association is of the mutually different [events]. Such difference is not evident in the objects of seeing, etc. Therefore, they do not function in mutual association.

न च केवलमन्यत्वं द्रष्टव्यादेर्न विद्यते।

कस्य चित्केन चित्सार्धं नान्यत्बमुपपद्यते ॥ ४

na ca kevalamanyatvaṁ draṣṭavyāderna vidyate |  
kasya citkena citsārdhaṁ nānyatvamupapadyate || 4

B: Not only are the seen and so forth alone not existing as other, it is invalid for anything simultaneous with something to be other [than it].

S: Not only does the differentness of that which is seen, etc. not exist,  
Also the differentness of something coming from another does not obtain.

G: No only in seeing, etc., Is there no such difference: When one thing and another are simultaneous, It is also not tenable that there is difference.

I: Not only do different natures in the object perceived, etc., not exist, but it is also not possible for an entity to have a different nature jointly with another.

K: It is not only that the difference with regard to objects of seeing, etc. is not evident; the possibility of something possessing difference jointly with another is also not appropriate.

अन्यदन्यत्प्रतीत्यान्यन्नान्यदृते ऽन्यतः।

यत्प्रतीत्य च यत्तस्मात्तदन्यन्नोपपद्यते ॥ ५

anyadanyatpratītyānyannānyadr̥te 'nyataḥ |  
yatpratītya ca yattasmāttadanyannopapadyate || 5

B: The other is other in dependence upon the other. Without the other, the other would not be other. It is invalid for whatever is dependent on something to be other than that.

SB: We would not be together If we were apart.

S: A thing is different insofar as it presupposes a second different thing.  
One thing is not different from another thing without the other thing.

G: A different thing depends on a different thing for its difference. Without a different thing, a different thing wouldn't be different. It is not tenable for that which depends on something else To be different from it.

I: Differentiation comes about by the relational conditions of different (entities) and it does not exist removed from them. And yet by virtue of the relational factor, there cannot be a differentiation between the entities involved.

K: Different things are dependent upon different things. Different things are not without different things. Because something depends upon something, a different thing is not appropriate.

यद्यन्यदन्यदन्यस्मादन्यस्मादप्यृते भवेत्।

तदन्यदन्यदन्यस्मादृते नास्ति च नास्त्यतः ॥ ६

yadyanyadanyadanyasmādananyasmādapyṛte bhavet ।  
tadanyadanyadanyasmādṛte nāsti ca nāstyataḥ ॥ 6

B: If the other was other than the other, then, without the other, it would be other. Without the other it would not be other. Therefore, it does not exist.

SB: I am other than you In relation to you; I could not be your other without you. Were I other than you I would be someone else; I cannot be your other without you.

S: If one different thing is different from a second different thing, it exists without a second different thing; But without a second different thing, one different thing does not exist as a different thing.

G: If a different thing were different from a different thing, Without a different thing, a different thing could exist. But without that different thing, that different thing does not exist. It follows that it doesn't exist.

I: If a different (entity) is different because it arises from another different (entity), then it will also exist removed from the latter. But such a situation of a different (entity) cannot possibly exist.

K: If a thing is different from another because it arises from a different thing, then it would exist even without that other thing. However, that other thing does not exist without the other, and therefore, it does not exist.

नान्यस्मिन् विद्यते ऽन्यत्त्वमनन्यस्मिन् न विद्यते।

अविद्यमाने चान्यत्त्वे नास्त्यन्यद्वा तदेव वा ॥ ७

nānyasmin vidyate 'nyatvamananyasmin na vidyate |  
avidyamāne cānyatve nāstyanyadvā tadeva vā || 7

B: Otherness does not exist in the other. Nor does it exist in what is not other. If otherness does not exist, neither the other nor that itself exists.

SB: There is no otherness In either you or me; Without otherness, There is no me or you.

S: Differentness does not exist in a different thing, nor in what is not different. When differentness does not exist, then there is neither what is different nor "this" [from which something can be different].

G: Difference is not in a differnt thing. Nor is it in a nondifferent thing. If difference does not exist, Neither different nor identical things exist.

I: It is not possible for a differentiation to exist in a different or non-different (entity). When a differentiation does not exist, difference and identity also do not exist.

K: A differenece is not evident in relation to a different thing. Nor is it not evident in a different thing. When difference is not evident, there is neither differene nor identity.

न तेन तस्य संसर्गो नान्येनान्यस्य युज्यते।

संसृज्यमानं संसृष्टं संस्रष्टा च न विद्यते ॥ ८

na tena tasya saṁsargo nānyenānyasya yujyate |  
saṁsṛjyamānaṁ saṁsṛṣṭaṁ saṁsraṣṭā ca na vidyate || 8

B: That does not connect with that. The other too does not connect with the other. The connecting, the connection and the connector too do not exist.

SB: I do not connect with me Nor do I connect with you – Not connecting, no Connections, no connectors.

S: Unification is not possible by [uniting] one thing with that one thing, nor by [uniting] one thing with a different thing;

Thus, the becoming unified, the state of being united, and the one who unites are not possible.

I: The combination of identical entities or of different entities is not justifiable. For, there cannot exist a presently combining, an already combined, and the agent which combines.

K: The association of identical things or of different things is not proper. Neither the associating nor the associated nor even the agent of association is evident.

## स्वभावपरीक्षा नाम पञ्चदशमं प्रकरणं

svabhāvaparīkṣā nāma pañcadaśamaṁ prakaraṇam

B: Investigation of Essences

SB: Essence

S: An Analysis of a Self-existent Thing (svabhava) (being and non-being)

G: Examination of Essence

I: Examination of Self-nature

K: Examination of Self-nature

न संभवः स्वभावस्य युक्तः प्रत्ययहेतुभिः ।

हेतुप्रत्ययसंभूतः स्वभावः कृतको भवेत् ॥ १

na sambhavaḥ svabhāvasya yuktaḥ pratyayahetubhiḥ |  
hetupratyayasambhūtaḥ svabhāvaḥ kṛtako bhavet || 1

B: It is unreasonable for an essence to arise from causes and conditions. Whatever essence arose from causes and conditions would be something that has been made.

SB: If my essence came From causs and conditions, It would have been constructed.

S: The production of a self-existent thing by a conditioning cause is not possible,

[For,] being produced through dependence on a cause, a self-existent thing would be "something which is produced" (krtaka).

G: Essence arising from Causes and conditions makes no sense. If essence came from causes and conditions, Then it would be fabricated.

I: The rise of self-nature by relational and causal conditions is not justifiable. For, such a self-nature will have a character of being made or manipulated.

K: The occurrence of self-nature through causes and conditions is not proper. Self-nature that has occurred as a result of causes and conditions would be something that is made.

स्वभावः कृतको नाम भविष्यति पुनः कथं।

अकृत्रिमः स्वभावो हि निरपेक्षः परत्र च ॥ २

svabhāvaḥ kṛtako nāma bhaviṣyati punaḥ katham |  
akṛtrimaḥ svabhāvo hi nirapekṣaḥ paratra ca || 2

B: How is it possible for there to be "an essence which has been made?"  
Essences are not contrived and not dependent on anything else.

SB: Essences are neither contingent nor contrived.

S: How, indeed, will a self-existent thing become "something which is produced"?  
Certainly, a self-existent thing [by definition] is "not-produced" and is independent of anything else.

G: How could it be appropriate For fabricated essence to come to be? Essnece itself is not artificial And does not depend on another.

I: How is it possible for the self-nature to take on the character of being made? For, indeed, the self-nature refers to something which cannot be made and has not mutual correspondence with something else.

K: Again, how could there be a self-nature that is made? Indeed, an unmade self-nature is also non-contingent upon another.

कुतः स्वभावस्याभावे परभावो भविष्यति।

स्वभावः परभावस्य परभावो हि कथ्यते ॥ ३

kutaḥ svabhāvasyābhāve parabhāvo bhaviṣyati |  
svabhāvaḥ parabhāvasya parabhāvo hi kathyate || 3

B: If an essence does not exist, how can the thingness of the other exist?  
[For] the essence of the thingness of the other is said to be the thingness of the other.

SB: If I have no essence, how can you? What is other for me is for you your own –  
How can you not be Yourself or someone else?

S: If there is an absence of a self-existent thing, how will an other-existent thing  
(parabhava) come into being?

Certainly the self-existence of an other-existent thing is called "other-existence."

G: If there is no essence, How can there be difference in entities? The essence of  
difference in entities Is what is called the entity of difference.

I: Where self-nature is non-existent, how could there be an extended nature? For,  
indeed, a self-nature which has the nature of being extended will be called an  
extended nature. [note: *Parabhava*, in the sense of extended nature, means that an  
entity has the existential character of extending or reaching over into the nature of  
other entities. It also means other-nature in contrast to self-nature. However, the  
argument obtains regardless of the translation.]

K: In the absence of self-nature, whence can there be other-nature? For, self nature  
of other-nature is called other-nature.

स्वभावपरभावाभ्यामृते भावः कुतः पुनः ।

स्वभावे परभावे वा सति भावो हि सिध्यति ॥ ४

svabhāvaparabhāvābhyāmṛte bhāvaḥ kutaḥ punaḥ |  
svabhāve parabhāve vā sati bhāvo hi sidhyati || 4

B: Apart from an essence and the thingness of the other, what things are there? If  
essences and thingnesses of others existed, things would be established.

S: Further, how can a thing [exist] without either self-existence or other-existence?  
If either self-existence or other existence exist, then an existing thing, indeed,  
would be proved.

G: Without having essence or otherness-essence, How can there be entities? If  
there are essences and entities, Entities are established.

I: Again, separated from self-nature and extended nature, how could existence be? For, indeed, existence establishes itself in virtue of either self-nature or extended nature.

K: Without self-nature and other-nature, whence can there be an existent? For, the existent is established only when there is self-nature or other-nature.

भावस्य चेदप्रसिद्धिरभावो नैव सिध्यति।

भावस्य ह्यन्यथाभावमभावं ब्रुवते जनाः ॥ ५

bhāvasya cedaprasiddhirabhāvo naiva sidhyati |  
bhāvasya hyanyathābhāvamabhāvaṁ bruvate janāḥ || 5

B: If things were not established, non-things would not be established.  
[When] a thing becomes something else, people say that it is a non-thing.

SB: Without something, There could be no nothing – Do not people say: A thing becomes nothing When it changes into something else?

S: If there is no proof of an existent thing, then a non-existent thing cannot be proved.  
Since people call the other-existence of an existent thing a "non-existent thing."

G: If the entity is not established, A nonentity is not established. An entity that has become different Is a nonentity, people say.

I: If existence does not come to be (i.e., does not establish itself), then certainly non-existence does not also. For, indeed, people speak of existence in its varying nature as non-existence.

K: When the existent is not established, the non-existent is also not established. It is, indeed, the change of the existent that people generally call the non-existent.

स्वभावं परभावं च भावं चाभावमेव च।

ये पश्यन्ति न पश्यन्ति ते तच्चं बुद्धशासने ॥ ६

svabhāvaṁ parabhāvaṁ ca bhāvaṁ cābhāvameva ca |  
ye paśyanti na paśyanti te tattvaṁ buddhaśāsane || 6

B: Those who view essence, thingness of the other, things and non-things do not see the suchness in the teaching of the awakened.

SB: You who behold Somethings and nothings, Yourself and others, Are blind to what the Buddha taught.

S: Those who perceive self-existence and other-existence, and an existent thing and a non-existent thing,  
Do not perceive the true nature of the Buddha's teaching.

G: Those who see essence and essential difference, And entities and nonentities, They do not see The truth taught by the Buddha.

I: Those who see (i.e., try to understand) the concepts of self-nature, extended nature, existence, or non-existence do not perceive the real truth in the Buddha's teaching.

K: Those who perceive self-nature as well as other-nature, existence as well as non-existence, they do not perceive the truth embodied in the Buddha's message.

कात्यायनाववादे चास्तीति नास्तीति चोभयं ।

प्रतिषिद्धं भगवता भावाभावविभाविना ॥ ७

kātyāyanāvavāde cāstīti nāstīti cobhayaṃ ।  
pratiṣiddhaṃ bhagavatā bhāvābhāvavibhāvinā ॥ 7

B: Through knowing things and non-things, the Buddha negated both existence and non-existence in his Advice to Katyayana.

SB: Through understanding Somethings and nothings, Gautama told Katyayana To relinquish being and nothingness.

S: In "The Instruction of Katyayana" both "it is" and "it is not" are opposed  
By the Glorious One, who has ascertained the meaning of "existent" and non-existent."

G: The Victorious One, through knowledge Of reality and unreality, In the *Discourse to Katyayana*, Refuted both "it is" and "it is not."

I: According to the Instructions to Katyayana, the two views of the world in terms of being and non-being were criticized by the Buddha for similarly admitting the bifurcation of entities into existence and non-existence. [note: The Sanskrit,

Katyayanavavada, either refers to the sutra or to the instructions given to Katyayana by the Buddha.]

K: In the admonition to Katyayana, the two theories [implying] “exists” and “does not exist” have been refuted by the Blessed One who is adept in existence as well as in non-existence.

यद्यस्तिब्रं प्रकृत्या स्यान्न भवेदस्य नास्तिता।

प्रकृतेरन्यथाभावो न हि जातूपपद्यते ॥ ८

yadyastitvaṃ prakṛtyā syānna bhavedasya nāstitā |  
prakṛteranyathābhāvo na hi jātūpapadyate || 8

B: If [things] existed essentially, they would not come to non-existence. It is never the case that an essence could become something else.

SB: If I had an essence, I would never cease to be me – My nature could never be anything else.

S: If there would be an existent thing by its own nature, there could not be 'non-existence' of that [thing].

Certainly an existent thing different from its own nature would never obtain.

G: If existence were through essence, Then there would be no nonexistence. A change in essence Could never be tenable.

I: If existence is in virtue of a primal nature, then its non-existence does not follow. For, indeed, a varying character of a primal nature is not possible at all.

K: If existence were to be in terms of primal nature, then there would not be its non-existence. A change of primal nature is certainly not appropriate.

प्रकृतौ कस्य चासत्यामन्यथाब्रं भविष्यति।

प्रकृतौ कस्य च सत्यामन्तथाब्रं भविष्यति ॥ ९

prakṛtau kasya cāsatyāmanyathābṛvaṃ bhaviṣyati |  
prakṛtau kasya ca satyāmantathābṛvaṃ bhaviṣyati || 9

B: If essences did not exist, what could become something else? Even if essences existed, what could become something else?

SB: If I had no essence, Whose nature would it be to be anything else?

S: [An opponent asks:]

If there is no basic self-nature (prakṛti), of what will there be "otherness"?

[Nagarjuna answers:]

If there is basic self-nature, of what will there be "otherness"?

G: If there is no essence, What could become other? If there is essence, What could become other?

I: If primal nature does not exist, what will possess the varying character? If, on the other hand, primal nature does exist, what then will possess the varying character? [note: The opponent raises the first question and Nagarjuna counters with the second. He follows up with an answer in the next two verses.]

K: When primal nature is non-existent, whose change would there be? When primal nature is existent, whose change would there be?

अस्तीति शाश्वतग्राहो नास्तीत्युच्चेददर्शनं।

तस्मादस्तिबनास्तिबे नाश्रीयेत विचक्षणः ॥ १०

astīti śāśvatagrāho nāstītyuccedadarśanaṃ |  
tasmādashitvanāstitve nāśrīyeta vicakṣaṇaḥ | | 10

B: "Existence" is the grasping at permanence; "non-existence" is the view of annihilation. Therefore, the wise do not dwell, in existence or non-existence.

S: "It is" is a notion of eternity. "It is not" is a nihilistic view.

Therefore, one who is wise does not have recourse to "being" or "non-being."

G: To say "it is" is to grasp for permanence. To say "it is not" is to adopt the view of nihilism. Therefore a wise person Does not say "exists" or "does not exist."

I: Existence is the grasping of permanency (i.e., permanent characteristics) and non-existence the perception of disruption. (As these functions are not strictly possible), the wise should not rely upon (the concepts of) existence and non-existence.

K: "Exists" implies grasping after eternalism. "Does not exist" implies the philosophy of annihilation. Therefore, a discerning person should not rely upon either existence or non-existence.

अस्ति यद्धि स्वभावेन न तन्नास्तीति शाश्वतं।

नास्तीदानीमभूत्पूर्वमित्युच्चेदः प्रसज्यते ॥ ११

asti yaddhi svabhāvena na tannāstīti śāśvataṁ ।  
nāstīdānīmabhūtpūrvamityuccedaḥ prasajyate ।। 11

B: "Since that which exists by its essence is not non-existent," is [the view of] permanence. "That which arose before is now non-existent," leads to [the view of] annihilation.

SB: "I am me, I will never not be" – The longing for eternity. "I used to be , I am not any more" – The cut of annihilation. The sage avoids being and nothingness.

S: That which exists by its own nature is eternal since "it does not not-exist."  
If it is maintained: "That which existed before does not exist now," there annihilation would logically follow.

G: "Whatever exists through its essence Cannot be nonexistent" is eternalism. "It existed before but doesn't now" Entails the error of nihilism.

I: It follows that permanency means that existence based on self-nature does not become a non-entity and disruption means that what formerly was existent is now non-existent.

K: "Whatever that exists in terms of self-nature, that is not non-existent" implies eternalism. "It does not exist now, but existed before" implies annihilation.