

पूर्वापरकोटिपरीक्षा नामैकादशमं प्रकरणं

B: Investigation of Extremes of Before and After (Before)

S: An Analysis of the Past (purva) and Future Limits (aparakiti) [of Existence] (samsara)

G: Examination of the Initial and Final Limits

I: Examination of Antecedent and Consequent States in the Empirical Realm

K: Examination of the Prior and Posterior Extremities

पूर्वा प्रज्ञायते कोटिर्नेत्युवाच महामुनिः।

संसारो ऽनवराग्रो हि नास्यादिर्नापि पश्चिमं ॥ १

B: When asked, "is a before-extreme evident?" the great Muni said, "it is not." Samsara has no beginning, no end; it has no before, no after.

S: The great ascetic [Buddha] said: "The extreme limit (koti) of the past cannot be discerned." "Existence-in-flux" (samsara) is without bounds; indeed, there is no beginning nor ending of that [existence].

SB: Was there are before before? If life has no beinning and no end, No before and no after, How can it be centered in a present?

G: When asked about the beginning, the Great Sage said that nothing is known of it. Cyclic existence is without end and beginning. So there is no beginning or end.

I: The great wise one (i.e. Sakyamuni) has said that the state anterior to samsara (i.e., life-death cycle or the empirical realm) cannot be grasped. For, samsara has no beginning and end; that is to say, no definite points of commencement and conclusion.

K: The Great Sage has stated that the prior end is not known. The life-process is without beginning and end. There is neither a beginning nor an end.

नैवाग्रं नावरं यस्य तस्य मध्यं कुतो भवेत्।

तस्मान्नात्रोपपद्यन्ते पूर्वापरसहक्रमाः ॥ २

B: For that without beginning [and] end, where can a middle be in that? Therefore, it is not possible for it to have before, after, and simultaneous phases.

S: How could there be a middle portion of that which has no "before" and "after"; it follows that "past," "future," and "simultaneous events" do not obtain.

G: Where there is no beginning or end, how could there be a middle? It follows that thinking about this in terms of prior, posterior, and simultaneous is not appropriate.

I: As there are no beginning and end, how could there be a middle? Therefore, the simultaneity, anterior, and posterior states (of samsara) are not possible.

K: How could there be the middle of that which has neither a beginning nor an end? Therefore, the methods of (distinguishing) the prior, the posterior or both together (i.e., the middle) are not appropriate.

पूर्वम् जातिर्यदि भवेज्जरामरणमुत्तरं।

निर्जरामरणा जातिर्भवेज्जायेत चामृतः ॥ ३

B: If birth were before and aging/death after, there would be birth without aging/death and also without dying one would be born.

S: If birth [is regarded as] the former, and growing old and dying [are regarded as] coming into being later, then birth exists without growing old and dying, and [something] is born without death.

SB: Were birth before and death after, I would be immortal with no history.

G: If birth came first, and then old age and death, then birth would be ageless and deathless, and a deathless one would be born.

I: If birth is anterior and old age-death is posterior, then there will be birth without old age-death and this will entail the rise of a deathless being.

K: If birth were to come first and decay and death were to follow, then birth would be without decay and death, and an immortal would thus emerge.

पश्चाज्जातिर्यदि भवेज्जरामरणमादितः।

अहेतुकमजातस्य स्याज्जरामरणं कथं ॥ ४

B: If birth were after and aging/death before, how could there be an uncaused aging/death which has no birth?

S: If birth were later, and growing old and dying were earlier, how would there be an uncaused growing old and dying of something unborn?

SB: Were death first and birth later, The dead would be unborn.

G: If birth were to come after, and old age and death first, how could there be a causeless aging and death of one not born?

I: If birth is posterior and old age-death anterior, that would constitute a state of non-causal connection. For, of something yet to be born, how could there be old age-death?

K: If birth were to be posterior and decay-death anterior, then the latter would be without a cause. How could there be decay-death of one who is not born?

न जरामरणेनैव जातिश्च सह युज्यते।

त्रियेत जायमानश्च स्याच्चाहेतुकतोभयोः ॥ ५

B: It is not suitable for birth and aging/death to be simultaneous; that which is being born would be dying and both would be without cause.

S: And a birth which is simultaneous with growing old and dying is likewise impossible; for, that which is being born would die, and both would be without cause.

SB: I cannot be born and die at once. If birth were death, They would both be unoriginated.

G: Birth and age and death cannot occur at one time. Then what is being born would be dying and both would occur without cause.

I: Indeed, birth is never conceived to be simultaneous with old age-death. For, what is in the process of being born must die and both life and death are non-causally related.

K: Indeed, decay-death as concomitant of birth is not proper. (In that case,) what is in the process of being born will also be dying and both would be rendered causeless.

.यत्र न प्रभवन्त्येते पूर्वापरसहक्रमाः ।

प्रपञ्चयन्ति तां जातिं तज्जरामरणं च किं ॥ ६

B: Why fixate on that birth, that aging/dying, for which the phases of before, after, simultaneity are impossible?

S: Since the past, future, and simultaneous activity do not originate, to what purpose [do you] explain in detail [the existence of] birth, growing old and dying?

SB: Why am I transfixed by them?

G: When the series of the prior, simultaneous, and posterior is not possible, why are you led to posit this birth, aging, and death?

I: Where states of anterior, posterior, and simultaneity (of samsara) do not exist, how could the concepts of birth and old age-death be projected?

K: Wherever such methods (of discriminating) the prior, the posterior, and the simultaneous do not arise, why be obsessed by such birth and such decay-death.

.कार्यं च कारणं चैव लक्ष्यं लक्षणमेव च ।

वेदना वेदकश्चैव सन्त्यर्था ये च के चन ॥ ७

B: It is not just samsara alone that has no before-extreme, cause and fruit themselves, and characteristics and the basis for characteristics themselves,

S: That which is produced and its cause, as well as the characteristic and that which is characterized, the sensation and the one who senses, and whatever other things there are –

G: Not only is cyclic existence itself without beginning, no existent has a beginning: neither cause and effect; nor character and characterized. . .

I: Cause and effect, characteristics and characterizations, feeler and feeling, and also whatever other things exist. . .

K: Effect and cause as well as characterized and characteristic, together with feeling and feeler or whatever fruits there are,

पूर्वा न विद्यते कोटिः संसारस्य न केवलं ।

सर्वेषामपि भावानां पूर्वा कोटी न विद्यते ॥ ८

B: feeling and the feeler, whatever is suitable to bear meaning, also all things have no before-extreme.

S: Not only is the former limit of existence-in-flux (samsara) not to be found, but the former limit of all those things is not to be found.

G: nor feeling and the feeler; whatever there is: all entities are without beginning.

I: . . . not only is there not an anterior state in samsara but this state is not possible for all existences.

K: the prior end of these is not evident. Of the entire life-process as well as of all existents, the prior end is not evident.

दुःखपरीक्षा नाम द्वादशमं प्रकरणं

B: Investigation of Anguish

S: An Analysis of Sorrow (dukkha) (suffering)

G: Examination of Suffering

I: Examination of Suffering

K: Examination of Suffering

स्वयं कृतं परकृतं द्वाभ्यां कृतमहेतुकं।

दुःखमित्येक इच्छन्ति तच्च कार्यं न युज्यते ॥ १

B: Some assert that anguish arises from being made by self, made by other, by both, without cause. To do that is not suitable.

S: Some say: Sorrow (dukkha) is produced by oneself (i), or by another (ii), or by both [itself and another] (iii), or from no cause at all (iv); but [to consider] that [sorrow (dukkha)] as what is produced is not possible.

G: Some say suffering is self-produced, or produced from another or from both. Or that it arises without a cause. It is not the kind of thing to be produced.

I: Some assert that suffering arises by virtue of being self-caused, other-caused, both self and other-caused or non-causal. Such an assertion which treats suffering as an effect is not justifiable.

K: Some assume that suffering is self-caused, caused by another, caused by both or without a cause. (Suffering as) such an effect is indeed not appropriate.

स्वयं कृतं यदि भवेत्प्रतीत्य न ततो भवेत्।

स्कन्धानिमानमी स्कन्धाः संभवन्ति प्रतीत्य हि ॥ २

B: If it were made by self, therefore it would not be contingently arising, because those aggregates arise contingently on these aggregates.

S: If it were produced by itself (i.e. self-causation), it would not exist dependent on something else. Certainly those "groups of universal elements" (skandhas) exist presupposing these "groups."

SB: If anguish created itself, It would not be contingent, For the pain depends On what I'm doing now.

G: If suffering came from itself, then it would not arise dependently. For those aggregates arise in dependence on these aggregates.

I: If suffering is self-caused, it will not have a relational condition in arising. For, surely, these (present) skandhas are relationally conditioned in the arising of those (future) skandhas.

K: If (suffering were to be) self-caused, then it could not occur dependently. Indeed, depending upon these aggregates, these other aggregates occur.

यद्यमीभ्य इमे ऽन्ये स्युरेभ्यो वामी परे यदि।

भवेत्परकृतं दुःखं परैरेभिरमी कृताः ॥ ३

B: If that were other than this and if this were other than that, anguish would be made by other and that would be made by those others.

S: If these were different from those, or if those were different from these, sorrow (dukkha) would be produced by something other than itself (i.e. other-causation), because those would be made by these others.

SB: Were it other than me And I other than it, The pain would be caused By someone else.

G: If those were different from these, or if these were different from those, suffering could arise from another. These would arise from those others.

I: If these (present) skandhas are different from those (future) skandhas or if the latter are other than the former, then there will be suffering caused by something else and those (future) skandhas will also be caused by it.

K: If from these those that are different were to come to be, or if from those these different (things) were to come to be, then suffering would be caused by another, for these are caused by those that are different.

स्वपुद्गलकृतं दुःखं यदि दुःखं पुनर्विना।

स्वपुद्गलः स कतमो येन दुःखं स्वयं कृतं ॥ ४

B: If anguish were made by one's own person, who would that person be who has made anguish by himself, but is not included in the anguish?

S: If sorrow (dukkha) is made through one's own personality (i) (svapudgala), then one's own personality would be without sorrow (dukkha); who is that "own personality" by which sorrow (dukkha) is self-produced (i)?

SB: Who am I if I create My own suffering?

G: If suffering were caused by a person himself, then who is that person – by whom suffering is caused – who exists distinct from suffering?

I: If suffering is caused by the individual himself, then the individual is separated from suffering. Who is this individual self which self-causes suffering?

K: If suffering is caused by one's own person, then that own person can exist without suffering. Who is he by whom suffering is self-caused?

परपुद्गलजं दुःखं यदि यस्मै प्रदीयते।

परेण कृत्वा तद्दुःखं स दुःखेन विना कुतः ॥ ५

B: If anguish arose from another person, how could it be suitable for there to be [someone] not included in the anguish, who has been given it by another who made the anguish?

S: If sorrow (dukkha) were produced by a different personality (ii) (parapudgala), how would he, to whom is given that sorrow (dukkha) by another after he had produced it, be without sorrow (dukkha)?

SB: How can I be apart From pain I cause myself?

G: If suffering comes from another person, then who is that person – when suffering is given by another – who exists distinct from suffering?

I: If suffering is caused by another individual, where is this self which is separated from suffering but which is (seemingly) the recipient of the suffering caused by another?

K: If suffering were to be produced by one person and given over to another, that suffering is caused by the former. How can the latter be identified without suffering?

परपुद्गलजं दुःखं यदि कः परपुद्गलः।

विना दुःखेन यः कृत्वा परस्मै प्रहिणोति तत् ॥ ६

B: If anguish arose [from] another person, who would that other person be who, having made it, gives it to someone else, but is not included in the anguish?

S: If sorrow (dukkha) is produced by a different personality, who is that different personality who, while being without sorrow (dukkha), yet makes and transmits that [sorrow (dukkha)] to the other?

SB: Who am I if I can feel The suffering you create? Can I be apart From pain you cause me? Who are you who hurt me? How can you be apart From pain you cause me?

G: If another person causes suffering, who is that other one who bestowed that suffering, distinct from suffering?

I: If suffering is caused by another individual, what is (the nature of) this individual which is separated from and yet causes and bestows suffering to the recipient?

K: If suffering is caused by another person, who is that other person who, himself without suffering, causes it and bestows it on another?

.स्वयं कृतस्याप्रसिद्धेर्दुःखं परकृतं कुतः।

परो हि दुःखं यत्कुर्यात्तत्तस्य स्यात्स्वयं कृतं ॥ ७

B: Since it is not established as made by self, how can anguish have been made by other? [For] whatever anguish is made by other, that has been made by his self.

S: It is not established that sorrow (dukkha) is self-produced (i), [but] how is [sorrow (dukkha)] produced by another (ii)? Certainly the sorrow (dukkha), which would be produced by another (ii), in his case would be self-produced (i').

SB: Anguish is not caused by me. How can it be caused by you? Anguish caused by you is caused by your me too.

G: When self-caused is not established, how could suffering be caused by another? Whoever caused the suffering of another must have caused his own suffering.

I: As self-cause cannot be established, where can an other-caused suffering be? For, surely, an other-caused suffering is caused by that other itself.

K: With the non-establishment of self-causation, how can there be suffering caused by another? For, indeed, if another were to cause that suffering, in relation to him it would be self-caused.

न तावत्स्वकृतं दुःखं न हि तेनैव तत्कृतं।

परो नात्मकृतश्चेत्स्याद्दुःखं परकृतं कथं ॥ ८

B: Anguish is not made [by] self; that is not made by that itself. If it is not made by an other self, how can anguish be made by other?

S: Sorrow (dukkha) is not self-produced (i), for that which is produced is certainly not produced by that [personality]. If the "other" (para) is not produced by the individual self (atma), how would sorrow (dukkha) be that produced by another?

SB: Suffering is not caused by me, For I do not cause myself. If uncaused by another me, How could it be caused by you?

G: No suffering is self-caused. Nothing causes itself. If another is not self-made, how could suffering be caused by another?

I: In truth then, there is no self-caused suffering for it cannot come about by itself. If an other does not bring about its own suffering, why is there an other-caused suffering?

K: So long as suffering is not self-caused, it is, indeed, not caused by oneself. If the other were not to do it by himself, how could suffering be caused by another?

स्याद्दुःखाभ्यां कृतं दुःखं स्यादेकैककृतं यदि।

पराकारास्वयंकारं दुःखमहेतुकं कुतः ॥ ९

B: If it is made by each, anguish would be made by both. Not made by self, not made by other, how can anguish have no cause?

S: Sorrow (dukkha) could be made by both [self and the "other"] (iii) if it could be produced by either one. [But] not produced by another, and not self-produced (iv) —how can sorrow (dukkha) exist without a cause?

SB: If both of us cause pain, Would not it be caused By we who have no part in it? Can anguish be uncaused?

G: If suffering were caused by each, suffering could be caused by both. Not caused by suffering or by other, how could suffering be uncaused?

I: If suffering could be caused individually by one's self and by an other, then there should also be suffering caused by itself nor by an other?

K: If suffering were to be caused by both, it would be caused by each individually. Whence can here be suffering that is caused neither by another nor by oneself and is without cause?

न केवलं हि दुःखस्य चातुर्विध्यं च विद्यते।

बाह्यानामपि भावानां चातुर्विध्यं न विद्यते ॥ १०

B: Not only does anguish alone not have the four aspects, external things too do not have the four aspects.

S: Not only are the four [causal] interpretations not possible in respect to sorrow (dukkha), [but also] none of the four [causal] interpretations is possible even in respect to external things (bhava).

SB: Suffering is nothing special. Even jugs and rolls of cloth Do not come from themselves, Others, both or nothing.

G: Not only does suffering not exist in any of the fourfold ways: no external entity exists in any of the fourfold ways.

I: Not only is the four-fold causal view of suffering impossible but the same is not possible with respect to the external elements of being.

K: It is not that the fourfold theory applied exclusively to suffering is not evident. The fourfold theory pertaining to other existents too is not evident.