



B = Stephen Batchelor? (according to internet site)

S = Frederick J. Streng, EMPTINESS: A STUDY IN RELIGIOUS MEANING (New York: Abingdon Press, 1967), Appendix A & B; pp. 183-227

G = Jay L. Garfield, THE FUNDAMENTAL WISDOM OF THE MIDDLE WAY: NAGARAJUNA'S MULAMDHYAMAKAKARIKA (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995)

SG = rJe Tsong khapa, Translated by Geshe Ngawang Samten and Jay L. Garfield, OCEAN OF REASONING: A Great Commentary on Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakarikā (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006)

I = Kenneth K. Inada, NAGARJUNA: A TRANSLATION OF HIS MULAMADHYAMAKAKARIKA WITH AN INTRODUCTORY ESSAY (Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1970)

K= David J. Kalupahana, MULAMADHYAMAKAKARIKA OF NAGARJUNA: THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1986)

मूलमध्यमककारिका

दृष्टिपरीक्षा नाम सप्तविंशतितं प्रकरणं

B: Investigation of Views (Opinion)

S: An Analysis of the Views (drsti) About Reality (dogmas) - 30 verses

G: Examination of Views

SG: Examination of Views

I: Examination of (Dogmatic) Views

K: Examination of Views

दृष्टयो ऽभूवं नाभूवं किं न्व् अतीते ऽध्वनीति च।

यास्ताः शाश्वतलोकाद्याः पूर्वान्तं समुपाश्रिताः ॥ १



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B: Those views such as “I occurred or did not occur in the past,” the world is permanent, are dependent on the extreme of before.

S: Those [views] relating to the limits of the past reality are: "The world is eternal," etc.,

[And "I have existed in the past," "I have not existed in the past," etc.]

G: The views “in the past I was” or “I was not”
And the view that the world is permanent, etc.,
All of these views
Depend on a prior limit.

SG: The views “in the past I was” or “I was not”
And the view that the world is permanent, etc.,:
All of these views
Depend on a prior limit.

I: Whether or not I existed in the past or whether this world is constant, etc., are (questions) all based upon the views of an anterior state of things

NOTE: De La Vallée Poussin has reconstructed the missing first half of this verse from the Tibetan sources. Cf. p. 571 of the Prasannapada

K: Whatever views asserting an eternal world, etc. based upon [the perception]: “Did I exist or not exist in the past?” are associated with the prior end [of existence].

दृष्टयो न भविष्यामि किमन्यो ऽनागते ऽध्वनि।

भविष्यामीति चान्ताद्या अपरान्तं समाश्रिताः ॥ २

B: Those views such as I will occur or not occur at another time in the future, the world has an end, are dependent on the extreme of Later.

S: The assertion: "I will not become something different in a future time," "I will become [something different]," and the alternative, etc., are relating to an end [in the future].

G: The view “in the future I will become other” or “I will not do so”
And that the world is limited, etc.,
All of these views
Depend on a final limit.

SG: The view “in the future I will exist at another time” or “I will not do so”



And that the world is limited, etc.
All of these views
Depend on a posterior limit.

I: Whether or not I will exist in the future or whether the (world has) limits etc., are (questions) all based upon the views of a posterior state of things.

K: Whatever views asserting the finite, etc. based upon [the perception]: "Would I not exist in the future or would I become someone else?" are associated with the posterior end [of existence].

अभूमतीतमध्वानमित्येतन्नोपपद्यते।

यो हि जन्मसु पूर्वेषु स एव न भवत्ययं ॥ ३

B: It is incorrect to say: 'I occurred at a time in the past.' Whatever occurred before, that is not this.

S: [The assertion:] "I existed in a past time (1)" does not obtain,
Since this [present being] is not (i.e. "ii" is not the same as "i") that one who [was] in a former birth.

G: To say "I was in the past"
Is not tenable.
What existed in the past
Is not identical to this one.

SG: To say "I was in the past"
Is not tenable.
What existed in the past
Is not identical to this one.

I: It is not possible to assert (categorically) that I existed in the past. For, what had been the case in the anterior state of existence is not the same now.

K: The view that I existed in that past is not appropriate, for whosoever was in the previous birth, he, indeed, is not identical with his person.

स एवात्मेति तु भवेदुपादाणं विशिष्यते।

उपादानविनिर्मुक्त आद्वा ते कतमः पुनः ॥ ४



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B: If you think that that became me, then that-which-is-clung-to would be something else. What is your self apart from that-which-is-clung-to?

S: Were he [in a previous birth], that individual self (*atma*) which he acquires [in coming into existence] would be different.

Moreover, what kind of individual self is there without acquisition (*upadana*)?

G: According to you, this self is that,
But the appropriator is different.
If it is not the appropriator,
What is your self?

SG: If, according to you, that is the self,
Then the appropriator would be different.
Apart from the appropriator,
What is your self?

I: (Granted that) the self-same *atman* exists (i.e., in the previous and present states) but with a different perceptual clinging (*upadana*), what kind of an *atman* is it, then, which is separated from clinging?

K: If it were to occur [to someone]: "He, indeed, is the self," then grasping is identified. Separated from grasping, what constitute (sic) your self?

उपादानविनिर्मुक्तो नास्त्यात्मेति कृते सति।

स्यादुपादानमेवात्मा नास्ति चात्मेति वः पुनः ॥ ५

B: Were you [to say] that there exists no self apart from that-which-is-clung-to, if the very that-which-is-clung-to were the self, your self would be non-existent.

S: If it were held that: "There is no individual self without the acquisition,"
Then the individual self would be [only] the acquisition or it is not an individual self [at all].

G: Having shown that there is no self
Other than the appropriator,
The appropriator should be the self.
But it is not your self.

SG: Having shown that there is not self
Apart from the appropriated,
If the appropriated is the self,
Your self does not exist.



I: If *atman* cannot exist separated from perceptual clinging, then the clinging itself will be the *atman*. But again, according to your assertion, there could be no *atman*.

K: When it is assumed that there is no self separated from grasping, grasping itself would be the self. Yet, this is tantamount to saying that there is no self.

नचोपादानमेवाद्वा व्येति तत्समुदेति च।

कथं हि नामोपादानमुपादाता भविष्यति ॥ ६

B: The very that-which-is-clung-to is not the self: it arises and passes away. How can that-which-has-been-clung-to be the one that clings?

S: The individual self is not the acquisition, since that [acquisition] appears and disappears.

Now really, how will "he who acquires" become "that which is acquired"?

G: Appropriating is not the self.

It arises and ceases.

How can one accept that

Future appropriating is the appropriator?

SG: The appropriated is not the self.

It arises and ceases.

How can the appropriated

Be the appropriator?

I: Again, clinging *per se* is not *atman* because it rises and vanishes. Indeed, how could perceptual clinging be identified with a perceiver?

K: Grasping is not identical with the self, for that [i.e., grasping] ceases and arises. Furthermore, how can grasping be the grasper?

अन्यः पुनरुपादानादात्मा नैवोपपद्यते।

गृह्येत ह्यनुपादानो यद्यन्यो न च गृह्यते ॥ ७

B: It is not correct for the self to be other than that-which-is-clung-to. If it were other, with nothing to cling to, then something [i.e. the self] fit to be apprehended would not be apprehended.



S: Moreover, it does not obtain that the individual self is different from the acquisition.

If the individual self were different, it would be perceived without the acquisition; but [in fact] it is not so perceived.

G: A self that is different

From the appropriating is not tenable.

If it were different, then in a nonappropriator

There should be appropriation. But there isn't.

SG: It is not tenable that the self is different

From the appropriated.

If it were different, then without the appropriated

It should be observed. But it is not.

I: Again, an *atman* different from perceptual clinging is not possible. If it were different then, surely, a non-perceptual clinging *atman* would also be a possibility. But that is not the case.

K: Furthermore, a self that is different from grasping is not appropriate. A person who is without grasping can be observed. However, if he were to be different [from grasping], he could not be observed.

एवं नान्य उपादानान्न चोपादानमेव सः ।

आत्मा नास्त्यनुपादानो नापि नात्येष निश्चयः ॥ ८

B: In that way, it is not other than that-which-is-clung-to nor is it that-which-is-clung-to. The self is not not that-which-is-clung-to, nor can it be ascertained as nothing.

S: Thus that [individual self] is not different from nor identical to the acquisition.

The individual self is not without acquisition; but there is no certainty that "It does not exist."

G: So it is neither different from the appropriating

Nor identical to the appropriating.

There is no self without appropriating.

But it is not true that it does not exist.

SG: So it is neither different from the appropriated

Nor identical to the appropriated.

There is no self without appropriation.



But it is not ascertained that it does not exist.

I: Consequently, *atman* cannot be identical or different from perceptual clinging. It cannot be ascertained further that there is non-perceptual clinging or that the *atman* does not exist.

K: Thus, he is neither different from grasping nor identical with it. A self does not exist. Yet, it is not the case that a person who does not grasp does not exist. This much is certain.

नाभूमतीतमध्वानमित्येतन्नोपपद्यते।

यो हि जन्मसु पूर्वेषु ततो ऽन्यो न भवत्ययम् ॥ ९

B: It is incorrect to say: "I did not occur at a time in the past." Whatever occurred before, this is not other than that.

S: [The assertion:] "I have not existed in a past time (2)" does not obtain,
For that one [now living] is not different (i.e. "ii" is not different than "i") from that one who was in a former birth.

G: To say "in the past I wasn't"
Would not be tenable.
This person is not different
From whoever existed in previous times.

SG: To say "in the past I did not exist"
Would not be tenable.
This person is not different
From whoever existed in previous lives.

I: It is not possible to assert (categorically) that I did not exist in the past. For, this existence is no different from what has been the case in the anterior state of existence.

K: The statement, "I did not exist in the past," is not appropriate, for this person is not different from whosoever existed in the previous lives.

यदि ह्ययं भवेदन्यः प्रत्याख्यायापि तं भवेत्।

तथैव च स संतिष्ठेत्तत्र जायेत वामृतः ॥ १०



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B: If this were other, it would arise even without that. Likewise, that could remain and be born without dying in that [former life].

S: If that [present person] were different, he would exist in exclusion of that [former] one.

Therefore either that [former person] persists, or he would be born eternal!

G: If this one were different,
Then if that one did not exist, I would still exist.
If this were so,
Without death, one would be born.

SG: If this one were different,
Then I would exist even without it having existed.
If this were so,
Without that one dying, this one would be born.

I: If this existence were different (from what had been the case in the anterior state) then, surely, it would exist independently or detached. It would subsist thus and so, or arise to persist eternally.

K: If this person were to be different [from that person in the previous existence], then he would come to be even forsaking that person. In that case he would remain the same and, in such a context, an immortal would emerge.

उच्चेदः कर्मणां नाशस् तथान्येन कृतकर्मणां।

अन्येन परिभोगः स्याद् एवमादि प्रसज्यते ॥ ११

B: Cut off and actions wasted, acts committed by others would be experienced by someone else. Such would be the consequences.

S: -- note 4 : Verse 11 is not available in the Sanskrit text, but it is known from the Tibetan translation

G: Annihilation and the exhaustion of action would follow;
Different agents' actions
Would be experienced by each other.
That and other such things would follow.

SG: The cutting of the continuum and the nullification of karma would follow;
The karma accumulated by some
Would be experienced by others.
This and other such absurdities would follow.



I: If that were the case then such erroneous notions as interruption, destruction of actions, actions done by someone but enjoyed by another, etc., would accordingly follow.

NOTE: This Sanskrit verse is missing but, deriving from Tibetan sources, added by De La Vallée Poussin. Cf. p. 580 of the *Prasannapada*.

K: [If that were the case,] there would be annihilation and destruction of accusations. This implies that the fruits of action performed by one will be experienced by another.

नाप्यभूत्वा समुद्भूतो दोषो ह्यत्र प्रसज्यते।

कृतको वा भवेदात्मा संभूतो वाप्यहेतुकः ॥ १२

B: There is no occurrence from what has not occurred. In that case faults would follow: the self would be something made or even though it occurred it would be uncaused.

S: There is no existing thing which is "that which has not existed prior." Therefore, the error logically follows that
Either the individual self is "what is produced" or it originates without a cause.

G: Nothing comes to exist from something that did not exist.
From this errors would arise.
The self would be produced
Or, existing, would be without a cause.

SG: Nothing comes to exist from something that did not exist.
Absurd consequences would follow from this:
The self would be produced,
Would arise anew, or be without a cause.

I: Again it is not the case that present existence arose without an anterior existence for, otherwise, an error will result. This would mean that *atman* will either have a creative nature or be something without a cause.

K: Yet, in that context, the error of assuming an emergent without prior existence does not follow. Either the self would be caused or, if it has occurred, it would be without a cause.

एवं दृष्टिरतीते या नाभूमहमभूमहं।



उभयं नोभयं चेति नैषा समुपपद्यते ॥ १३

B: Therefore, 'the self occurred, did not occur, both or neither:' all those views of the past are invalid.

S: Thus the view concerning the past which [asserts] "I have existed (1)," or "I have not existed (2),"

Both ["existed and not existed"] (3) or neither (4): this does not obtain at all.

G: So, the views "I existed," "I didn't exist,"
Both or neither,
In the past
Are untenable.

SG: So the views "I existed," "I didn't exist,"
Both, or neither
In the past
Are untenable.

I: Consequently, the (false) views that I existed in the anterior state, I did not exist, both or neither, are all impossible.

K: Thus, whatever view there is such as, "I existed in the past; I did not exist; both or neither," is not really appropriate.

अध्वन्यनागते किं नु भविष्यामीति दर्शनं।

न भविष्यामि चेत्येतदतीतेनाध्वना समं ॥ १४

B: 'I will occur at another time in the future,' 'I will not occur:' all those views are similar to [those of] the past.

S: [The views:] "I will become something in a future time (1),"
Or "I will not become (2) [something]," etc. (3') (4'), [should be considered] like those [views] of the past.

G: To say "In the future I will exist or
Will not exist,"
Such a view is like
Those involving the past."

SG: To say "in the future I will exist" or



“I will not exist”:

Such views are like
Those involving the past.

I: The view, whether or not I will exist in the posterior state, is the same (i.e. analogous) as that discussed with respect to the anterior state of existence.

K: A view such as “Will I exist in the future?” or “Will I not exist in the future?” is comparable to those associated with the past.

स देवः स मनुष्यश्चेदेवं भवति शाश्वतं।

अनुत्पन्नश्च देवः स्याज्जायते न हि शाश्वतं ॥ १५

B: If the divine were human, then there would be something permanent. The divine is utterly unborn, because there is no birth in permanence.

S: If "This is a man, this is a god" [obtains], then eternity (i) exists,
For god is unproduced, and certainly something eternal would not be born.

G: If a human were a god,
On such a view there would be permanence.
The god would be unborn.
For any permanent thing is unborn.

SG: If a god were a human,
Then it would be permanent.
The god would be unborn.
For that which is permanent is unborn.

I: If the heavenly being is a human being, then there will be constancy. For, the heavenly being will be unborn and, moreover, a constant being will not arise.

K: If it is thought that a human is the same as a divine being, then there would be the eternal, if the divine being were to be non-arisen, then he would not be born and that could constitute the eternal.

देवादन्यो मनुष्यश्चेदशाश्वततमतो भवेत्।

देवादन्यो मनुष्यश्चेत्संततिर्नोपपद्यते ॥ १६



B: If the human were other than the divine, then there would be no permanence. If the divine and the human were different, there could be no continuity [between them].

S: If man is different from god, there would exist something non-eternal (ii).
If man is different from god, then a continuity does not obtain.(i.e. they cannot be different)

G: If a human were different from a god,
On such a view there would be impermanence.
If the human were different from the god,
A continuum would not be tenable.

SG: If a human were different from a god,
Then it would be impermanent.
If the human and the god were different,
Their continuum would not be tenable.

I: If a human being is different from the heavenly being, then there will be non-constancy. If that is so, there cannot possibly be a continuity (of beings)

K: If it is thought that a human is the same as a divine being, then there would be the non-eternal. If it is thought that a human is different from a divine being. Then continuity is not appropriate.

दिव्यो यद्येकदेशः स्यादेकदेशश्च मानुषः।

अशाश्वतं शाश्वतं च भवेत्तच्च न युज्यते ॥ १७

B: If one part were divine and one part were human, there would be both permanence and no permanence. But that is not reasonable.

S: If one part were divine and another part human, (i.e. a man with an eternal soul)
Then there would be something non-eternal [together with] that which is eternal (iii); but that is not possible.

G: If one part were divine and
One part were human,
It would be both permanent and impermanent.
That would be irrational.

SG: If he were partly divine
And partly human,



He would be both permanent and impermanent.
That would make no sense.

I: If one portion is heavenly and another human, then there will be both constancy and non-constancy. If that is so, there cannot possibly be a continuity (of beings)

K: If a part were to be divine and the other part to be human, then there would be both the eternal and the non-eternal, and this too would not be proper.

अशाश्वतं शाश्वतं च प्रसिद्धमुभयं यदि।

सिद्धे न शाश्वतं कामं नैवाशाश्वतमित्यपि ॥ १८

B: If both permanence and impermanence were established, you would have to assert non-permanence and non-impermanence as established.

S: If something both non-eternal and eternal were proved,
Then, no doubt, something "neither eternal nor non-eternal (iv)" is proved.

G: If it could be established that
It is both permanent and impermanent,
Then it could be established that
It is neither permanent nor the impermanent.

SG: If it could be established that
He is both permanent and impermanent,
Then one would have to say that
He is neither permanent nor impermanent.

I: If both constancy and non-constancy could be established (concomitantly),
then similarly neither constancy nor non-constancy could also be established at will.

K: Supposing both the eternal and the non-eternal are established, then it is not possible to either assert the eternal or the non-eternal.

कुतश्चिदागतः कश्चित्किं चिद्गच्छेत्पुनः क्व चित्।

यदि तस्मादनादिस्तु संसारः स्यान्न चास्ति सः ॥ १९



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B: If something came from somewhere and went somewhere, then *samsara* would be without beginning. That is not the case.

S: If someone, having come from somewhere, in some way goes somewhere again,

Then there would be existence-in-flux with no beginning; but this is not the case.

G: If anyone had come from anyplace
And were then to go someplace,
It would follow that cyclic existence was beginningless.
This is not the case.

SG: If anyone had come from anyplace
And were then to go anyplace,
It would follow that cyclic existence was beginningless.
This is not the case.

I: If anyone comes from somewhere and again goes (or returns) to somewhere else, then *samsara* will indeed be beginningless. However, such a situation does not exist.

K: If anyone has come from somewhere and again were to go somewhere, then the life-process would be beginningless. Such a situation does not exist.

नास्ति चेच्छाश्वतः कश्चित्को भविष्यत्यशाश्वतः ।

शाश्वतो ऽशाश्वतश्चापि द्वाभ्यामाभ्यां तिरस्कृतः ॥ २०

B: If there were nothing permanent at all, what thing could be impermanent, permanent and impermanent, free of both?

S: If someone who is eternal does not exist, who will exist being non-eternal,
Or who being both eternal and non-eternal, or devoid of these two
[characteristics]?

G: If nothing is permanent,
What will be impermanent,
Permanent and impermanent,
Or neither?

SG: If nothing is permanent
What could be impermanent,
Permanent and impermanent,



Both of these are eliminated?

I: If there is nothing constant, (by the same token) how could there be anything non-constant, both constant and non-constant, and separated from both constant and non-constant.

K: If it is though that there is nothing eternal, what is it that will be non-eternal, both eternal and non-eternal, and also what is separated from these two?

अन्तवान् यदि लोकः स्यात्परलोकः कथं भवेत्।

अथाप्यनन्तवांलृ लोकः परलोकः कथं भवेत्॥ २१

B: If this world had an end, how would the next world come to be? If this world had no end, how would the next world come to be?

S: If the world would come to an end, how would an other-world come into existence?

If the world would not come to an end, how would an other-world come into being?

G: If the world were limited,
How could there be another world?
If there world were unlimited,
How could there be another world?

SG: If the world had an end,
How could there be a next world?
If the world had no end,
How could there be a next world?

I: If the world has limits, how could there be another world? On the other hand, if the world has no limits, how could there be another world?

NOTE: Loka is either the world or the realm of existence

K: If the world were to have a limit, how could there be another world?
Furthermore, if the world were to have no limit, how could there be another world?

स्कन्धानामेष संतानो यस्माद्दीपार्चिषामिव।



प्रवर्तते तस्मान्नान्तानन्तवत्त्वं च युज्यते ॥ २२

B: Because the continuity of the aggregates is similar to the light of a lamp, therefore the very existence or non-existence of an end is unreasonable.

S: Since the continuity of the "groups of universal elements" (skandhas) [from one moment to the next] functions like flames of lamps,
[The view:] "both having an end and not having an end" is not possible.

G: Since the continuum of the aggregates
Is like the flame of a butterlamp,
It follows that neither its finitude
Nor its infinitude makes sense.

SG: Since the continuum of the aggregates
Is like the flame of a butterlamp,
It follows that neither its finitude
Nor its infinitude makes sense.

I: The continuity of (the function of) the *skandhas* is like the continual burning of the flame and, therefore, it is not possible to speak of limits or non-limits.

K: As this series of aggregates proceeds along like a flame of a lamp,
[speculation about] its finitude or its infinitude is not proper.

पूर्वे यदि च भज्येरन्नुत्पद्येरन्न चाप्यमी।

स्कन्धाः स्कन्धान् प्रतीत्येमानथ लोको ऽन्तवान् भवेत्। २३

B: If the former perished and that [future] aggregate did not arise in dependence upon this aggregate, then this world would have an end.

S: If the former ["groups"] would disappear, those [new] "groups" which are dependent on those [former] "groups" would not arise;
Therefore, the world would come to an end (ii).

G: If the previous were disintegrating
And these aggregates, which depend
Upon those aggregates, did not arise,
Then the world would be finite.

SG: If the previous ones had ceased,



And depending on these aggregates
Those aggregates would not arise,
Then the world would be finite.

I: If a *skandha* is destroyed in the anterior state and the present *skandha* does not arise by being relationally conditioned by the former, then the realm (of function) will have limits.

K: If the prior aggregates were to be destroyed and these aggregates were also not to arise depending upon these other [aggregates], then the world would be finite.

पूर्वे यदि न भज्येरन्नुत्पद्येरन्न चाप्यमी।

स्कन्धाः स्कन्धान् प्रतीत्येमाण् लोको ऽनन्तो भवेदथ ॥ २४

B: If the former did not perish and that [future] aggregate did not arise in dependence upon this aggregate, then this world would not have an end.

S: If the former ["groups"] would not disappear, these [new] "groups" which are dependent on those [former] "groups" would not arise;
Therefore, the world would be eternal (i).

G: If the previous were not disintegrating
And these aggregates, which depend
Upon those aggregates, did not arise,
Then the world would be infinite.

SG: If the previous ones had not ceased,
And depending on these aggregates
Those aggregates did not arise,
Then the world would be infinite.

I: If a *skandha* is not destroyed in the anterior state and the present *skandha* does not arise by being relationally conditioned by the former, then the realm (of function) will not have any limits.

K: If the prior aggregates were not to be destroyed and these aggregates were also not to arise depending upon these other [aggregates], then the world would be infinite.

अन्तवानेकदेशश्चेदेकदेशस्त्वनन्तवान्।



स्यादन्तवाननन्तश्च लोकस्तच्च न युज्यते ॥ २५

B: If one part had an end and one part did not have an end, the world would be with and without an end. That too is unreasonable.

S: If one part were finite and the other were infinite,
The world would be both finite and infinite (iii); but this is not possible.

G: If one part were finite and
One part were infinite,
Then the world would be finite and infinite.
This would make no sense.

SG: If it were partly finite and
Partly infinite,
Then the world would be finite and infinite.
This would make no sense.

I: If one portion is limited and another non-limited, then perhaps the realm (of
function) will be both limited and non-limited. But that is not possible.

K: If the world were to be partly finite and also partly infinite, it would be both finite
and infinite, and this too is also not proper.

कथं तावदुपादातुरेकदेशो विनश्यते।

न नश्यते चैकदेश एवं चैतन्न युज्यते ॥ २६

B: How can one part of the one-who-clings perish while one part does not
perish? Likewise, that is unreasonable.

S: Therefore, how can it be that one part of "one who acquires" [karma] will be
destroyed, (i.e. the body ñ man?)
And one part not destroyed? (i.e. the very subtle mind -- the divine part?) This
is not possible.

G: How could one think that
One part of the appropriator is destroyed
And one part is not destroyed?
This position makes no sense.

SG: How could one think that



The appropriator has partly ceased
And has partly non-ceased?
This does not make sense either.

I: How, indeed, could one portion of the perceiver be destroyed and another remain undestroyed? However, this (situation) is not possible.

NOTE: The perceiver is a collective term for the function of the *skandhas*.

K: How can it be possible that one part of a grasper is destroyed and the other part is not destroyed. This too is not proper.

उपादानैकदेशश्च कथं नाम विनश्यते।

न नश्यते चैकदेशो नैतदप्युपपद्यते ॥ २७

B: How can one part of that-which-is-clung-to perish while one part does not perish? Likewise, that is unreasonable.

S: How, indeed, can it be that one part of the acquisition [of karma] (i.e. the learning stored in the body) will be destroyed,
And one part not destroyed? (i.e. the learning stored in the mind) That, certainly does not obtain.

G: How could one think that
One part of the appropriation is destroyed
And one part is not destroyed?
This position makes no sense.

SG: How could one think that
The appropriated has partly ceased
And partly not ceased?
This does not make sense either.

I: How, indeed, could one portion of the perception be destroyed and other remain undestroyed? This, (situation), again, is not possible.

NOTE: The perception refers to the clinging or grasping function of the *skandhas*

K: How can it be possible that one part of grasping is destroyed and another part is not destroyed. This too is not appropriate.

अन्तवच्चाप्यनन्तं च प्रसिद्धमुभयं यदि।



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सिद्धे नैवान्तवत्कामं नैवानन्तवदित्यपि ॥ २८

B: If both the presence and absence of an end were established, you would have to assert non-presence and non-absence as established.

S: If the [view] "both finite and infinite" were proved,
Then no doubt, "neither finite nor infinite" (i.e. nothing at all) could be proved.

G: If it could be established that
It is both finite and infinite,
Then it could be established that
It is neither finite nor infinite.

SG: If it could be established that
It is both finite and infinite,
Then one would have to maintain that
It is neither finite nor infinite.

I: If both the limited and non-limited could be established (concomitantly), then similarly, neither the limited nor non-limited could also be established at will.

K: Supposing both the finite and the infinite are established, then it is not possible to assert either the finite or the infinite.

अथ वा सर्वभावानां शून्यत्वाच्छाश्वतादयः ।

क्व कस्य कतमाः कस्मात्संभविष्यन्ति दृष्टयः । २९

B: And because all things are empty, about what and in whom do views such as that of permanence spring forth?

S: Because of the emptiness of all existing things,
How will the views about "eternity," etc., come into existence, about what, of whom, and of what kind?

G: So, because all entities are empty,
Which views of permanence, etc., would occur,
And to whom, when, why, and about what
Would they occur at all?

SG: Alternatively, because all entities are empty,
Which views of permanence, etc., would occur,



And by what means, with respect to what, to whom,
And why would they occur at all?

I: Since all existences are of the nature of *sunyata*, where, by whom and in what manner could such (false) views on constancy, etc., ever arise?

K: Thus, because of the emptiness of all existents, where, to whom, which and for what reason views such as the eternal could ever occur?

सर्वदृष्टिप्रहाणाय यः सद्धर्ममदेशयत्।

अनुकम्पामुपादाय तं नमस्यामि गौतमं ॥ ३०

B: I bow down to Gautama, whose kindness holds one close, who revealed the sublime dharma in order to let go of all views.

S: To him, possessing compassion, who taught the real dharma
For the destruction of all views - to him, Gautama, I humbly offer reverence.

G: I prostrate to Gautama
Who through compassion
Taught the true doctrine,
Which leads to the relinquishing of all views.

SG: (Prostration to the Teacher in Gratitude for His Kindness in Teaching)
I prostrate to Gautama
Who, through compassion,
Taught the exalted Dharma,
Which leads to the relinquishing of all views.

I: I reverently bow o Gautama (the Buddha) who out of compassion has taught the truth of being (*saddharma*) in order to destroy all (false) views.

K: I reverently bow to Gautama who, out of compassion, has taught the true doctrine in order to relinquish all views.



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