



B = Stephen Batchelor? (according to internet site)

SB = Stephen Batchelor: VERSES FROM THE CENTER: A BUDDHIST VISION OF THE SUBLIME (New York: Riverhead Books, 2000)

S = Frederick J. Streng, EMPTINESS: A STUDY IN RELIGIOUS MEANING (New York: Abingdon Press, 1967), Appendix A & B; pp. 183-227

G = Jay L. Garfield, THE FUNDAMENTAL WISDOM OF THE MIDDLE WAY: NAGARAJUNA'S MULAMDHYAMAKAKARIKA (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995)

I = Kenneth K. Inada, NAGARJUNA: A TRANSLATION OF HIS MULAMADHYAMAKAKARIKA WITH AN INTRODUCTORY ESSAY (Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1970)

K= David J. Kalupahana, MULAMADHYAMAKAKARIKA OF NAGARJUNA: THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE WAY (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1986)

## मूलमध्यमककारिका

### विपर्यासपरीक्षा नाम त्रयोविंशतितमं प्रकरणं

- B: Investigation of Error (Confusion)
- S: An Analysis of Errors (viparyasa) (the perverted views)
- G: Examination of Errors
- SG: Examination of Errors
- I: Examination of the Perversion of Truth
- K: Examination of Perversions

संकल्पप्रभवो रागो द्वेषो मोहश्च कथ्यते।

शुभाशुभविपर्यासान् संभवन्ति प्रतीत्य हि ॥ १

B: It is said that desire, hatred, stupidity arise from conceptuality; they arise in dependence on the pleasant, the unpleasant and confusion. [they arise in dependence on confusion about the pleasant and unpleasant]

S: It is said that desire (raga), hate, and delusion are derived from mental fabrication (samkalpa),



Because they come into existence presupposing errors as to what is salutary and unsalutary.

G: Desire, hatred and confusion all  
Arise from thought, it is said.  
They all depend on  
The pleasant, the unpleasant, and errors.

SG: Desire, hatred and confusion  
Arise completely from conceptualization, it is said.  
They all arise in dependence on  
The pleasant, the unpleasant, and errors.

I: Covetousness, enmity, and delusion are said to arise from false ideation or conceptualisation. Indeed, they come about in virtue of the perverse relational play of purity and impurity.

K: Lust, hatred, and confusion are said to have thought as their source. Perversions regarding the pleasant and the unpleasant arise depending upon these.

शुभाशुभविपर्यासान् संभवन्ति प्रतीत्य ये।

ते स्वभावान्न विद्यन्ते तस्मात्क्लेशा न तत्त्वतः ॥ २

B: Whatever arises in dependence upon the pleasant, the unpleasant and confusion, (whatever arises in dependence on confusion about the pleasant and unpleasant) they have no own-nature, therefore, afflictions do not really exist (do not exist in themselves).

S: Those things which come into existence presupposing errors as to what is salutary and unsalutary  
Do not exist by their own nature (svabhava); therefore the impurities (klesa) do not exist in reality.

G: Since whatever depends on the pleasant and the unpleasant  
Does not exist through an essence,  
The defilements  
Do not really exist.

SG: Desire, hatred and confusion  
Arise completely from conceptualization, it is said.  
They all arise in dependence on  
The pleasant, the unpleasant, and errors.



I: That which comes about in virtue of the perverse relational play of purity and impurity cannot possibly have self-existence or self-nature. Therefore, defilements are not in the nature of thatness or truth.

K: Whatever perversions of the pleasant and the unpleasant that occur dependently are not evident in terms of self-nature. Therefore, the defilements are not in themselves.

आत्मनो ऽस्तित्वनास्तित्वे न कथं चिच्च सिध्यतः ।

तं विनास्तित्वनास्तित्वे क्लेशानां सिध्यतः कथं ॥ ३

B: The existence or non-existence of self is not established in any way. Without that, how can the existence or non-existence of afflictions be established?

S: The existence or non-existence of the individual self (*atma*) is not proved at all. Without that [individual self], how can the existence or non-existence of the impurities be proved?

G: The self's existence or nonexistence  
Has in no way been established.  
Without that, how could the defilements'  
Existence or nonexistence be established?

SG: Since whatever in dependence on the pleasant, the unpleasant,  
Or error does not exist through an essence,  
The afflictions  
Do not exist in reality.

I: The existence and non-existence of *atman* can never be established. How then could the existence and non-existence of defilement be established apart from the *atman*?

K: The existence or the non-existence of the self is not established in any way. Without that, how can the existence or the non-existence of defilements be established?

कस्य चिद्धि भवन्तीमे क्लेशाः स च न सिध्यति ।

कश्चिदाहो विना कं चित्सन्ति क्लेशा न कस्य चित् ॥ ४

B: These afflictions are someone's. But that [someone] is not established. Without [someone], the afflictions are not anyone's.



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S: For impurities exist of somebody, and that person is not proved at all.  
Is it not so that without someone the impurities do not exist of anybody?

G: The defilements are somebody's.  
But that one has not been established.  
Without that possessor,  
He defilements are nobody's.

SG: The one to whom the afflictions belong  
Has not been established as existent.  
Without anyone to whom they belong,  
There are no afflictions of anyone.

I: These defilements are said to exist with someone but such a person cannot be  
established. That is to say, separated from a person these defilements seem to  
exist independently without belonging to anyone.

K: These defilements, indeed, belong to someone. Yet, such a person is not  
established. In other words, in the absence of anyone, these defilements seem to  
exist without belonging to anyone.

स्वकायदृष्टिवत्क्लेशः क्लिष्टे सन्ति न पञ्चधा ।

स्वकायदृष्टिवत्क्लिष्टं क्लेशेष्वपि न पञ्चधा ॥ ५

B: Like [the self apprehended in] the view of one's own body, the afflictions do  
not exist in five ways in the afflicted. Like [the self apprehended in] the view of  
one's own body, the afflicted does not exist in five ways in the afflictions.

S: In reference to the view of having a body of one's own, the impurities do not  
exist in what is made impure according to the five-fold manner.  
In reference to the view of having a body of one's own, that which is made  
impure does not exist in the impurities according to the five-fold manner.

G: View the defilements as you view your self:  
They are not in the defiled in the fivefold way.  
View the defiled as you view your self:  
It is not in the defilements in the fivefold way.

SG: Just as one views one's own body, the afflictions are  
Not in the afflicted in the fivefold way.  
Just as one views one's own body, the afflicted is  
Not in the afflictions in the fivefold way.



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I: As in falsely viewing one's own body, the defilement do not exist in a fivefold manner with respect to the defiled person. As in falsely viewing one's own body, conversely, the defiled person does not exist in a fivefold manner with respect to the defilements.

K: The defilements are like the view of one's own personality. Within the defiled, they are not found in the fivefold way. The defiled is like the view of one's own personality, for even within the defilements it is not found in the fivefold way.

स्वभावतो न विद्यन्ते शुभाशुभविपर्ययाः ।

प्रतीत्य कतमान् क्लेशाः शुभाशुभविपर्ययान् ॥ ६

B: If confusion about the pleasant and unpleasant does not exist from its own nature, what afflictions can depend on confusion about the pleasant and unpleasant?

S: The errors as to what is salutary and non-salutary do not exist as self-existent entities (svabhavatas)

Depending on which errors as to what is salutary and non-salutary are then impurities?

G: The pleasant, the unpleasant and the errors  
Do not exist through essence.  
Which pleasant, unpleasant and errors  
Could the defilements depend upon?

SG: The pleasant, the unpleasant and the errors  
Do not exist through essence.  
What afflictions could depend  
On the pleasant, unpleasant, or errors?

I: The perversions of purity and impurity cannot exist from the standpoint of self-existence. In virtue of what type of perverse relational plays of purity and impurity do defilements exist?

K: The perversions regarding the pleasant and the unpleasant are not evident from the standpoint of self-nature. Depending upon which perversions of the pleasant and the unpleasant are these defilements?



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रूपशब्दरसस्पर्शा गन्धा धर्माश्च षड्विधं।

वस्तु रागस्य द्वेषस्य मोहस्य च विकल्प्यते ॥ ७

B: Colour/shape, sound, taste, tactile sensation, smell and dharmas: these six are conceived as the basis of desire, hatred and stupidity.

S: Form, sound, taste, touch, smell, and the dharmas: this six-fold Substance (vastu) of desire, hate, and delusion is imagined.

G: Form, sound, taste, touch, Smell, and concepts of things: These six Are thought of as the foundation of Desire, hatred and confusion.

SG: Material form, sound, taste, touch, Smell, and phenomena\*: These six Are thought of as the foundation of Desire, aversion and confusion.

\* Note says: *Chos/dharma*. This term here refers to the object of the cognitive faculty.

I: Material form, voice, taste, touch, smell, and the various factors of existence are conceptualized as the sixfold objects of covetousness, enmity, and delusion

K: Material form, sound, taste, touch, smell and concepts – these are discriminated as the sixfold foundations of lust, hatred, and confusion.

रूपशब्दरसस्पर्शा गन्धा धर्माश्च केवलाः।

गन्धर्वनगराकारा मरीचिस्वप्नसंनिभाः ॥ ८

B: Colour/shape, sound, taste, tactile sensation, smell and dharmas: these are like gandharva-cities and similar to mirages, dreams.

S: Form, sound, taste, touch, smell, and the dharmas are Merely the form of a fairy castle, like a mirage, a dream.

G: Form, sound, taste, touch, Smell, and concepts of things: These six Should be seen as only like a city of the Gandharvas and Like a mirage or a dream.

SG: Material form, sound, taste, touch,



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Smell, and phenomena: These six  
Are only like a city of gandharvas or  
Like a mirage or a dream.

I: Material form, voice, taste, touch, smell, and the various factors of existence  
are all merely like an imaginary city in the sky, a mirage, or a dream.

K: Material form, sound, taste, touch, smell as well as concepts – all these are  
comparable to the city of the *gandharvas* and resemble mirages and dreams.

अशुभं वा शुभं वापि कुतस्तेषु भविष्यति।

मायापुरुषकल्पेषु प्रतिबिम्बसमेषु च ॥ ९

B: How can the pleasant and unpleasant occur in those [things] which are like  
phantoms and similar to reflections?

S: How will "that which is salutary" or "that which is non-salutary" come into  
existence

In a formation of a magical man, or in things like a reflection?

G: How could the  
Pleasant and unpleasant arise  
In those that are like an illusory person  
And like a reflection?

SG: How could the  
Pleasant and unpleasant arise  
In those that are like an illusory person  
And like a reflection?

I: How could there be assertions of purity and impurity when, like the conceptions  
of a deluded mind, they are similar to shadowy representations?

K: How can the pleasant and the unpleasant come to be in people who are  
fabrications of illusion or who are comparable to mirror images?

अनपेक्ष्य शुभं नास्त्यशुभं प्रज्ञापयेमहि।

यत्प्रतीत्य शुभं तस्माच्छुभं नैवोपपद्यते ॥ १०

B: Something is called pleasant in dependence on the unpleasant. Since that  
would not exist without relation to the pleasant, therefore, the pleasant is not  
tenable.



S: We submit that there is no non-salutary thing unrelated to a salutary thing. [And in turn] depending on which, there is a salutary thing; therefore, a salutary thing does not obtain.

G: We say that the unpleasant  
Is dependent upon the pleasant,  
Since without depending on the pleasant there is none.  
It follows that the pleasant is not tenable.

SG: The unpleasant, depending on which  
The pleasant is imputed,  
Cannot exist without depending on the pleasant.  
Therefore, the pleasant is not tenable.

I: We provisionally assert that impurity cannot exist without being mutually dependent on purity and that, in turn, purity exists only as related to impurity. Therefore, purity perse is not possible.

K: We make known that the unpleasant does not exist without being contingent upon the pleasant, and that the pleasant, in its turn, is dependent upon that [i.e., the unpleasant]. Therefore, the pleasant [in itself] is not appropriate.

अनपेक्ष्याशुभं नास्ति शुभं प्रज्ञपयेमहि।

यत्प्रतीत्याशुभं तस्मादशुभं नैव विद्यते ॥ ११

B:  
Something is called 'unpleasant' in dependence on the pleasant. Since that would not exist without relation to the unpleasant, therefore, the unpleasant is not tenable.

S: We submit that there is no salutary thing unrelated to a non-salutary thing, [And in turn] depending on which, there is a non-salutary thing; therefore a non-salutary thing does not obtain.

G: We say that the pleasant  
Is dependent upon the unpleasant.  
Without the unpleasant there wouldn't be any.  
It follows that the unpleasant is not tenable.

SG: The pleasant, depending on which  
The unpleasant is imputed,  
Cannot exist without depending on the unpleasant,  
Therefore, the unpleasant is not tenable.



I: We provisionally assert that purity cannot exist without being mutually dependent on impurity and that, in turn, impurity exists only as related to purity. Therefore, impurity per se does not exist.

K: We make known that the pleasant does not exist without being contingent upon the unpleasant, and that the unpleasant, in its turn, is dependent upon that [i.e., the pleasant]. Therefore, the unpleasant [in itself] is not evident.

अविद्यमाने च शुभे कुतो रागो भविष्यति।

अशुभे ऽविद्यमाने च कुतो द्वेषो भविष्यति ॥ १२

B: If the pleasant does not exist, how can desire exist? If the unpleasant does not exist, how can hatred exist?

S: If "what is salutary" does not exist, how will there be desire [for it]? And if "what is non-salutary" does not exist, how will there be hatred [for it]?

G: Where there is no pleasant,  
How can there be desire?  
Where there is no unpleasant,  
How can there be anger?

SG: If there is no pleasant,  
How could there be desire?  
If there is no unpleasant,  
How could there be aversion?

I: When there is no purity per se, how could covetousness arise? Also, when there is no impurity per se, how could enmity arise?

K: When the pleasant is not evident, whence can there be lust? When the unpleasant is not evident, whence can there be hatred?

अनित्ये नित्यमित्येवं यदि ग्राहो विपर्ययः।

नानित्यं विद्यते शून्ये कुतो ग्राहो विपर्ययः ॥ १३

B: If such an apprehension as the impermanent is permanent is confused, since impermanence does not exist in the empty, how can such an apprehension be confused?



S: Even if the notion "What is permanent is in something impermanent" is in error,  
How can this notion be in error since "what is impermanent" does not exist in emptiness?

G: If to grasp onto the view  
"The impermanent is permanent" were an error,  
Since in emptiness there is nothing impermanent,  
How could that grasping be an error?

SG: If to grasp onto the view  
"The impermanent is permanent" were an error,  
Since that which is empty is not impermanent,  
How could that grasping be an error?

I: If perception is a perversion such that permanence is in impermanence, then it is not possible for impermanence to be in *sunya*. How then could that perception be a perversion?

K: If there were to be grasping on to the view, "What is impermanent is permanent," then there is perversion. The impermanent is not evident in the context of the empty. How can there be grasping or perversion?

अनित्ये नित्यमित्येवं यदि ग्राहो विपर्ययः ।

अनित्यमित्यपि ग्राहः शून्ये किं न विपर्ययः ॥ १४

B: If such an apprehension as "the impermanent is permanent" is confused, how would the apprehension "there is impermanence in the empty" also not be confused?

S: Even if the notion "what is permanent is in something impermanent" is in error, Is not then the notion concerning emptiness, i.e., that it is impermanent, in error?

G: If to grasp onto the view  
"The impermanent is permanent" were an error,  
Why isn't grasping onto the view  
"In emptiness there is nothing impermanent" an error?

SG: If to grasp onto the view  
"The impermanent is permanent" were an error,  
Why is grasping onto the view  
"That which is empty is impermanent" not an error?



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I: If perception is a perversion such that permanence is in impermanence, then again, how is it that the perception of impermanence with respect to *sunya* is not a perversion?

K: If grasping on to the view, “What is impermanent is permanent,” is perversion, how is it that even the grasping after the view, “What is empty is impermanent,” does not constitute a perversion?

येन गृह्णाति यो ग्राहो ग्रहीता यच्च गृह्यते।

उपशान्तानि सर्वाणि तस्माद्ग्राहो न विद्यते ॥ १५

B: [The means] by which one apprehends, the apprehension [itself], the apprehender and the apprehended: all are completely pacified, therefore there is no apprehending.

S: That by which a notion is formed, the notion, those who have notions, and that which is grasped [in the notion]:  
All have ceased; therefore, the notion does not exist.

G: That by means of which there is grasping, and the grasping,  
And the grasper, and all that is grasped:  
All are being relieved.  
It follows that there is no grasping.

SG: That by means of which there is grasping, and the grasping,  
And the grasper, and all that is grasped:  
All are being alleviated.  
It follows that there is no grasping.

I: That which depends on perceiving, the perception, the perceiver, and that which is perceived are all of the nature of quiescence. Therefore, perception in itself does not exist.

K: That through which there is grasping, whatever grasping there is, the grasper as well as that which is grasped – all these are appeased. Therefore, no grasping is evident.

अविद्यमाने ग्राहे च मिथ्या वा सम्यगेव वा।

भवेद्विपर्ययः कस्य भवेत्कस्याविपर्ययः। १६

B: If there is neither confused nor right apprehension, who is confused and who is not confused?



S: If a notion is not existing either as false or true,  
Whose is the error? Whose is the non-error?

G: If there is no grasping,  
Whether erroneous or otherwise,  
Who will come to be in error?  
Who will have no error?

SG: Since there is no grasping,  
Whether erroneous or correct,  
Who will come to be in error?  
Who will have no error?

I: As there is no perception, properly or improperly, who does and who does not  
have the perversion?

K: When grasping, wrongly or rightly, is not evident, for whom would there be  
perversion and for whom would there be non-perversion?

न चापि विपरीतस्य संभवन्ति विपर्ययाः।

न चाप्यविपरीतस्य संभवन्ति विपर्ययाः ॥ १७

B: Confusions do not occur for those who are [already] confused; confusions do  
not occur for those who are not [yet] confused;

S: Nor do errors of someone who has erred come into existence.  
Nor do errors of someone who has not erred come into existence.

G: Error does not develop  
In one who is in error.  
Error does not develop  
In one who is not in error.

SG: One who is already in error  
Cannot commit error.  
One who is not in error  
Cannot commit error.

I: Perversions do not come about even in one who perverts. Again, they do not  
come about even in one who does not perverse.

K: Perversions do not occur to one who is already subjected to perversion.  
Perversions do not occur to one who has not been subjected to perversions.



न विपर्यस्यमानस्य संभवन्ति विपर्ययाः।

विमृशस्व स्वयं कस्य संभवन्ति विपर्ययाः ॥ १८

B: confusions do not occur for those who are being confused. For whom do confusions occur? Examine this by yourself!

S: And errors of someone who is at present in error do not come into existence. Now you examine of whom do errors really come into existence!

G: Error does not develop  
In one in whom error is arising.  
In whom does error develop?  
Examine this on your own!

SG: One who is committing error  
Cannot commit error.  
Who can commit error?  
Examine this on your own!

I: Perversions do not come about even in one who is presently perverting.  
Consider seriously by yourself... in whom will the perversions arise?

K: Perversions do not occur to one who is being subjected to perversions. Reflect on your own! To whom will the perversions occur?

अनुत्पन्नाः कथं नाम भविष्यन्ति विपर्ययाः।

विपर्ययेष्वजातेषु विपर्ययगतः कुतः ॥ १९

B: If confusions are not born, how can they exist? If confusions are not born, where can there be someone who has confusion?

S: How in all the world will errors which have not originated come into existence? And if errors are not originated, how can there be someone involved in error?

G: If error is not arisen,  
How could it come to exist?  
If error has not arisen,  
How could one be in error?

SG: If error is not arisen,



How could it come to exist?  
If error has not arisen,  
How could one be in error?

I: How could there be non-originated perversions? When perversions have not occurred, how could there possibly be one who perverses?

K: Who could there be non-arisen perversions? When perversions are not born, whence can there be a person who is subjected to perversions?

न स्वतो जायते भावः परतो नैव जायते।

न स्वतः परतश्चेति विपर्ययगतः कुतः ॥ २०

B: Things are not born from themselves, not born from others. If they are also not from self and others, where can there be someone who has confusion?

S: Since no being is produced by itself, nor by something different, Nor by itself and something different at the same time, how can there be someone involved in error?

G: Since an entity does not arise from itself,  
Nor from another,  
Nor from another and from itself,  
How could one be in error?

SG: Since an entity does not arise from itself,  
Nor from another,  
Nor from another and itself,  
How could one be in error?

I: Existence does not come about by itself or by another. Nor does it come about by both self and other. How could there possibly be one who perverses?

K: An existent does not arise from itself, nor does it arise from another, not both itself and other. If so, whence can there be a person who is subject to perversions?

आत्मा च शुचि नित्यं च सुखं च यदि विद्यते।

आत्मा च शुचि नित्यं च सुखं च न विपर्ययः ॥ २१

B: If self and purity and permanence and happiness were existent, self and purity and permanence and happiness would not be confusions.



S: If the individual self, "what is pure," "what is eternal," and happiness really exist,  
Then the individual self, "what is pure," "what is eternal," and happiness are not errors.

G: If the self and the pure,  
The permanent and the blissful existed,  
The self, the pure, the permanent,  
And the blissful would not be deceptive.

SG: If the self and the pure,  
The permanent and happiness existed,  
The self, the pure, the permanent,  
And happiness would not be erroneous.

I: If *atman*, purity, permanence, and bliss are to be admitted (i.e., exist), then they are not to be considered as perversions.

K: If either the self, the pleasant, the permanent, or the happy is evident, then neither the self, the pleasant, the permanent, nor the happy constitutes a perversion.

नात्मा च शुचि नित्यं च सुखं च यदि विद्यते।

अनात्मा ऽशुच्यनित्यं च नैव दुःखं च विद्यते ॥ २२

B: If self and purity and permanence and happiness were non-existent, selflessness, impurity, impermanence and anguish would not exist.

S: But if individual self, "what is pure," "what is eternal," and happiness do not exist,  
Then non-individual self, "what is impure," "what is impermanent" and sorrow (*dukkha*) do not exist.

G: If the self and the pure,  
The permanent and the blissful did not exist,  
The nonself, the impure, the impermanent,  
And suffering would not exist.

SG: If the self and the pure,  
The permanent and happiness did not exist,  
The nonself, the impure, the impermanent,  
And suffering would not exist.



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I: If atman, purity, permanence, and bliss are not to be admitted (i.e., non-existent), then likewise *anatman*, impurity, impermanence, and suffering are not to be admitted.

K: If neither the self, the pleasant, the permanent, nor the happy is not evident, then neither the non-self, the unpleasant, the impermanent, nor the suffering would also be evident.

एवं निरुध्यते ऽविद्या विपर्ययनिरोधनात्।

अविद्यायां निरुद्धायां संस्काराद्यं निरुध्यते ॥ २३

B: Thus by stopping confusion, ignorance will stop. If ignorance is stopped, impulsive acts etc. will stop.

S: From the cessation of error ignorance ceases;  
When ignorance has ceased, conditioning forces (samskara) and everything else cease.

G: Thus, through the cessation of error  
Ignorance ceases.  
When ignorance ceases  
The compounded phenomena etc., cease.

SG: Thus, through eliminating the errors  
Ignorance is eliminated.  
When ignorance is eliminated,  
Such things as the actions are eliminated.

I: Consequently, ignorance is destroyed by the cessation of perversion. And by the destruction of ignorance, mental conformations, etc., are also destroyed.

K: Thus, with the cessation of perversion, ignorance ceases. When ignorance has ceased, the dispositions, etc. come to cease.

यदि भूताः स्वभावेन क्लेशाः के चिद्धि कस्य चित्।

कथं नाम प्रहीयेरन् कः स्वभावं प्रहास्यति ॥ २४

B: If the afflictions of some existed by their own nature, how could they be let go of? Who can let go of what exists by nature?

S: If any kind of self-existent impurities belong to somebody,



How in all the world would they be eliminated? Who can eliminate that which is self-existent?

G: If someone's defilements  
Existed through his essence,  
How could they be relinquished?  
Who could relinquish the existent?

SG: If any afflictions of anyone  
Existed essentially,  
How could they be relinquished?  
Who could relinquish the existent?

I: If the defilements really exist in someone in virtue of self-nature, how could they be abandoned and who could abandon the self-nature?

K: If, indeed, certain defilements of someone have not come to be on the basis of self-nature, how could they be relinquished? Who ever could relinquish self-nature?

यद्यभूताः स्वभावेन क्लेशाः के चिद्धि कस्य चित्।

कथं नाम प्रहीयेरन् को ऽसद्भावं प्रहास्यति ॥ २५

B: If the afflictions of some did not exist by their own nature, how could they be let go of? Who can let go of what does not exist?

S: If any kind of self-existent impurities do not belong to somebody,  
How in all the world would they be eliminated? Who can eliminate that which is non-self-existent?

G: If someone's defilements  
Did not exist through his essence,  
How could they be relinquished?  
Who could relinquish the nonexistent?

SG: If any afflictions of anyone  
Were essentially nonexistent,  
How could they be relinquished?  
Who could relinquish the nonexistent?

I: If the defilements do not really exist in someone in virtue of self-nature, how could they be abandoned and who is able to abandon non-realities?



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K: If, indeed, certain defilements of someone have not come to be on the basis of self-nature, how could they be relinquished? Who ever could relinquish non-existence?